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INTRODUCTION
Barring litigation,1 the “settlement class action” is one of the most
realistic and efficient means available through which victims of mass
torts2 receive compensation for their injuries.3  Defined as “a lawsuit
certified as a class action solely for the purpose of settling the claims
made in the complaint, rather than for litigating them,”4 the
settlement class action allows victims, as well as defendants, to escape
the exorbitant costs5 and complicated issues involved with litigating a
claim.6  Consequently, both lawyers and courts have fashioned the
                                                 
1. See Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos:  A Multi-Billion-Dollar
Crisis, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 383, 401-07 (1993) (noting that legislative response to
current asbestos litigation is unlikely, and asserting that settlement class actions offer
the best means to judicial reform).
2. See Anne E. Cohen, Mass Tort Litigation After Amchem, cited in ALI-ABA CIVIL
PRACTICE AND LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 269, 275-76 (1998)
(defining “mass tort” as multiple party litigation of tort claims, and categorizing mass
tort claims into four groups:  mass accidents, personal injury mass torts, property
damage mass torts, and economic loss torts); see also Joseph F. Rice & Nancy Worth
Davis, Judicial Innovation in Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 127, 127
n.2 (1997) (defining “mass tort” as a term that describes the occurrence of multiple
torts resulting from a single causal factor, such as asbestos exposure).
The settlement class action is also applicable outside the mass tort realm to claims
involving insurance fraud, securities, and consumer fraud.  See Cohen, supra, at 276
(noting that multiple claims can arise from property damages and economic losses);
see also Richard B. Schmitt, Class-Action Settlement Proposal Is Upset by Supreme Court
Ruling, WALL ST. J., July 10, 1997, at B10 (stating that settlement class actions have
been used to address a wide range of claims, from those involving arsenic poisoning
to those involving wood siding).  This Comment, however, focuses exclusively on the
use of settlement class actions in the mass tort context, especially those involving
asbestos-related claims.  Still, the arguments relating to settlement class actions in the
mass tort context are generally applicable to other areas as well.  Cf. Rice & Davis,
supra, at 140 (noting that all mass tort claims entail common problems).
3. See Note, Back to the Drawing Board:  The Settlement Class Action and the Limits of
Rule 23, 109 HARV. L. REV. 828, 831 n.24 (1996) [hereinafter Back to the Drawing
Board] (assuming that settlement class actions are a valuable tool in resolving mass
tort claims); cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805,
805-06 (1997) (asserting that adequate resolution of claims arising from a “mass
society” demands aggregate or collective adjudication of claims).  But see James A.
Henderson, Jr., Comment:  Settlement Class Actions and the Limits of Adjudication, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1014, 1014 (“Settlement class actions are inherently unlawful
because they . . . exceed the legitimate limits of adjudication.”).
4. John D. Aldock & Richard M. Wyner, The Use of Settlement Class Actions to
Resolve Mass Tort Claims After Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 33 TORT & INS. L.J.
905, 905 (1998).
5. See Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and “Settlement Class
Actions”:  An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 817 (1995) (discussing the high
costs associated with individual litigation of a mass tort claim and citing to a study
that found less than half of each dollar spent on asbestos litigation reaches the
injured plaintiff).  For example, cost is not only an issue for the litigants involved, but
also for those indirectly affected by the outcome of the case, such as the employees
and shareholders of a defendant corporation.  See Edley & Weiler, supra note 1, at
391 (claiming that “stakeholders in defendant firms . . . and surrounding
communities” carry the financial burden caused By tort litigation).
6. Cf. Cramton, supra note 5, at 817 (describing difficulties of individual trial of
a mass tort claim such as proof of causation, replication of evidence, and judicial
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settlement class action as a catchall solution to the explosion of mass
tort litigation7 and the crisis to which it has given birth.8
The settlement class action is a judicial creation9 that evolved from
the class action,10 which is governed and regulated by Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”).11  Although not explicitly
                                                 
delay).
7. See The Supreme Court, 1996 Term–Leading Cases, 111 HARV. L. REV. 197, 350
(1997) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (noting the significant increase of mass tort claims
being filed in the last few decades) (citing David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass
Torts:  Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 563 n.9 (1987)); see
also Aldock & Wyner, supra note 4, at 907 (noting that in the past ten years there has
been an “explosion” of mass tort claims being filed against corporate defendants);
Edley & Weiler, supra note 1, at 383 (“Federal and state courts are clogged with
100,000 asbestos suits . . . [a] number [that] is rising every month.”).
8. See Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 356 (perceiving asbestos litigation in the
throes of a crisis); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars:  The Dilemma of the Mass Tort
Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1346-47 (1995) (commenting that most
commentators agree that a mass tort litigation crisis exists, citing cost, corporate
bankruptcies, escalating attorney fees, and burdened court dockets as causal factors).
9. See Rice & Davis, supra note 2, at 145 (classifying settlement class actions as
one of the many innovative judicial responses to asbestos and other mass tort related
litigation); see also Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 3, at 828 n.1 (“‘[T]he
procedural phenomenon of the ‘settlement class’ is a relatively recent innovation in
the federal court settlement arsenal.’”) (quoting LINDA S. MULLENIX, MASS TORT
LITIGATION:  CASES AND MATERIALS 258 (1996)).
10. A class action permits a group of plaintiffs who meet all technical
requirements set forth by Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
aggregate their claims and litigate against defendants through representative parties.
See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
ACTION ix (1987) (defining the class action device as a procedural tool that allows
the combining of claims and defenses of many persons); see also Markham R.
Leventhal, Class Actions:  Fundamentals of Certification Analysis, 72 FLA. B.J. 10, 10
(1998) (“A class action is . . . a procedural device designed to promote the efficient
and orderly adjudication of substantive rights affecting an entire class of persons,
without the necessity of joining all such persons as formal parties.”).
11. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).  Rule 23 is referenced throughout this Comment.
Rule 23 states in pertinent part:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of
subdivision (a) are satisfied [numerosity, common questions of law or fact,
typicality, and adequacy of representation], and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class; or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede
their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole;
or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
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provided for, courts construe Rule 23 to extend to settlement class
actions.12  Other than Rule 23(e),13 a general provision that governs
court approval of dismissal and settlement of class actions, no
guidelines exist by which judges can determine the fairness,
reasonableness, or suitability of a proposed settlement.14  Thus, with
only judicial construction of Rule 23 and no clear procedural
guidance, it is not surprising that the legal system struggles with the
                                                 
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
Id.
12. See Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 3, at 828 (commenting that courts
have been forced to manipulate Rule 23 to handle the current mass tort litigation
crisis).
The Advisory Committee has been considering potential revisions to Rule 23 that
would resolve some of the current problems associated with mass tort litigation.  See
Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action Amendments,
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 615 (1997) (noting that the public comment phase on potential
revisions to Rule 23 ended on February 15, 1997).  In particular, the Advisory
Committee has discussed amending Rule 23 with provision Rule 23(b)(4), a fourth
class action category that would explicitly provide for settlement class actions.  See id.
at 622-24 (discussing proposed Rule 23(b)(4) provision).  The Rule 23(b)(4)
amendment would authorize courts to certify a settlement class action  “[if] the
parties to a settlement request certification under subdivision (b)(3) [of Rule 23] for
the purposes of settlement, even though the requirements of subdivision (b)(3)
might not be met for purposes of trial.”  Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 559, 559 (1996).
The proposed amendment of Rule 23(b) has caused considerable debate both
over the use of settlement class actions and the constitutionality of the proposed
provision (b)(4).  See generally Mullenix, supra, at 624-37 (evaluating the issues raised
by the proposed rule in the context of the Rules Enabling Act and as well as
constitutional arguments against proposed Rule 23(b)(4), and concluding that a
defeat of the proposed amendment on such grounds “will kill off the possibility of
resolving mass tort litigation”).  In addition, a number of legal scholars and
commentators debate various components of proposed Rule 23(b)(4).  See, e.g., Paul
D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking:
The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 ARIZ. L. REV.
461, 462-74 (1997) (arguing that proposed Rule 23(b)(4) is substantive and, thus,
violates the Rules Enabling Act’s rulemaking power); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action
‘Reform’:  Advisory Committee Bombshell, 215 N.Y. L.J. 1, 6 (1996) (defining a stipulation
as a proposal because it requires that parties settle before coming to the court and
questioning the constitutionality of the opt-out provision of Rule 23(b)(4)); Eric D.
Green, What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends?  We’ll Settle in Bunches:  Bringing Rule
23 into the Twenty-First Century, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1773, 1798-1800 (1997) (referring to
the proposed amendment as a “necessary and desirable improvement”); George L.
Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD.
521, 537-39 (1997) (reviewing the proposed changes to Rule 23, which gives greater
judicial control over the class action process and their criticism by a group of
academics, the Steering Committee).
13. Rule 23(e) states that “[a] class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court
directs.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
14. Cf. Cramton, supra note 5, at 823 (stipulating that Rule 23(e) is a provision
offering only “limited guidance” to courts evaluating proposed settlement class
actions because it contains general standards such as “fair” or “reasonable,” and
suggesting that the lack of detailed standards for these terms impairs judicial scrutiny
of settlements).
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permissibility of settlement class actions in the mass tort context.15
The debate over the advantages and disadvantages of class actions
has been well versed over the past several decades.16  Many legal
scholars and commentators have heralded the class action as a device
that gives leverage to plaintiffs seeking resolution of their claims in
the judicial system.17  Others have condemned the class action as a
means used by self-serving corporations to wage a battle against less
powerful plaintiffs.18  Nowhere is the debate more heated and
complex than in the context of a settlement class action.19
Although described by commentators as “cutting-edge judicial
innovation,”20 the continued existence of the settlement class action is
in jeopardy.  On June 22, 1998, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari,21 for a second time,22 to review a Fifth Circuit decision that
                                                 
15. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (noting that the Advisory
Committee considered extending Rule 23 to the mass tort context to provide for
settlement class actions).
16. Cf. Symposium, Mass Torts:  Serving Up Just Desserts, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811
(1995) (exploring common problems of class actions from various perspectives).
17. See Jeffrey G. Casurella & John R. Bevis, Class Action Law in Georgia:  Emerging
Trends in Litigation, Certification, and Settlement, 49 MERCER L. REV. 39, 70 (1997)
(concluding that proper use of class action lawsuits provides plaintiffs with
opportunities to ‘watchdog’ large corporations and constrain “conduct not otherwise
tolerated under our system of jurisprudence”); see also Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past
and Future of Defendant and Settlement Classes in Collective Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV.
687, 687 (1997) (commenting on the diverse perspectives of both the utility and
integrity of the settlement class).
18. See Green, supra note 12, at 1784 (describing plaintiffs as “have-nots” and
defendants as “haves”); see also John Leubsdorf, Co-Opting the Class Action, 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 1222, 1223 (“We fear that what was meant to provide a remedy for those who
would otherwise lack one, enabling them to pool their voices and finances, will
become a device to take away remedies from those who could otherwise invoke
them.”); Edwin Lamberth, Comment, Injustice by Process:  A Look at and Proposals for the
Problems and Abuses of the Settlement Class Action, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 149, 152 (1997-98)
(characterizing settlement class actions as a contemptuous tool that breeds injustice
and abuse); cf. Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps:  Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1049 (stating that settlement class actions
themselves are not an inherent evil, but expressing distaste for judges and lawyers
who use the device to resolve mass tort claims).
19. Commentators and legal scholars alike agree that the recent emergence of
settlement class actions has created heightened tension over the use of class actions
to resolve mass tort claims.  See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 5, at 811 (stating that the
debate over a settlement class action is the tension between individual justice and
judicial economy); Green, supra note 12, at 1783-88 (reviewing motivations of
academics as well as other groups for opposing settlement class actions); Lamberth,
supra note 18, at 151-52 (demonstrating inequities to a subsequent plaintiff that
resulted from settling an asbestos tort claim); Yeazell, supra note 17, at 687
(indicating that settlement class action cases have “sharply polarized the legal
community”).
20. Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 3, at 828.
21. The Esteban Ortiz objectors and the James Flanagan objectors filed two
separate petitions for certiorari on April 13 and April 16, 1998, seeking review of the
Fifth Circuit decision in Flanagan v. Ahearn, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam), cert. granted sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 524 U.S. 936 (1998).  See
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certified a settlement class action involving thousands of asbestos
claims.23  In Flanagan v. Ahearn,24 the Fifth Circuit approved a
                                                 
Ahearn Objectors Again Ask U.S. Supreme Court to Review Settlement, MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.:
ASBESTOS (Mealey Publications, Inc., King of Prussia, Pa), Apr. 17, 1998, at 3 (briefly
reviewing the procedural history of the case).  The Supreme Court granted certiorari
on June 22, 1998.  See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 524 U.S. 936 (1998).
22. The Supreme Court previously granted certiorari to Flanagan v. Ahearn,
90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), in 1997.  See Flanagan v. Ahearn, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997)
(mem.), vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).  The Fifth Circuit, in a terse opinion, re-affirmed their
prior decision approving certification of the settlement class action.  See Flanagan v.
Ahearn, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), aff’g 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996),
cert. granted sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 524 U.S. 936 (1998).  See infra note 23
(discussing the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ortiz v. Fibreboard, which reversed
and remanded Flanagan to the Fifth Circuit).
23. After this Comment had been selected for publication and was in the throes
of the production process, the Supreme Court decided and handed down its
decision in Ortiz v. Fibreboard, reversing the Fifth Circuit decision Flanagan v. Ahearn.
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999), rev’g Flanagan v. Ahearn, 134 F.3d 668
(5th Cir. 1998), vacated and remanded for further proceedings, 182 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir.
1999).  The Supreme Court did not address all the issues presented by the settlement
class action in Flanagan and focused upon in this Comment¾such as notice and due
process issues, ethical considerations, or the need for an inexpensive alternative
solution to individual litigation¾because it found that the proffered settlement class
action failed to qualify as a limited fund under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and therefore,
could not be certified as a settlement class action.  See id. at 2312 n.19 (refusing to
opine on whether the notice provided to class members bound by the mandatory
settlement class action was sufficient or even necessary); id. at 2312 (claiming that
the Court could not resolve “the ultimate question [of] whether settlements of
multitudes of related tort actions are amenable to mandatory class treatment”); id. at
2322 (leaving for “another day” the following question:  “[I]f a settlement class
action thus saves transaction costs that would never have gone into a class member’s
pocket in the absence of settlement, may a credit for some of the savings be
recognized in a mandatory class action as an incentive to settlement?”).  Thus, the
Court reversed and remanded the decision, thereby taking the “prudent course” and
presuming “that when subdivision (b)(1)(B) was devised to cover limited fund
actions, the object was to stay close to the historical model.”  See id. at 2300.
This Comment differs from the Supreme Court’s decision and finds that the
settlement class action presented in Flanagan qualified as a limited fund.  Based upon
this premise, this Comment then reaches issues that involve overall certification
standards and guidelines, due process concerns, and ethical issues raised with using
settlement class actions in a mass tort scenario.  Interestingly, Justice Breyer in his
dissent gives support for the views set forth and argued in this Comment:  that the
class action qualified as a limited fund and in any event, even if it did not, the Court
should have certified the settlement class on the basis of equity and public policy
concerns as an alternative solution to the growing number of asbestos cases
overwhelming the courts today.  See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2326 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(commenting that the settlement class action could be certified under Rule
23(b)(1)(B) as a limited fund, even though the majority concluded that it could
not); see also id. at 2325 (noting that the number of asbestos cases creates a “special
judicial problem” that “courts, not legislatures, ordinarily will resolve” and therefore,
“judges can and should search aggressively for ways, within the framework of existing
law, to avoid delay and expense so great as to bring about a massive denial of
justice”) (emphasis added).
Specifically, this Comment analyzes the settlement class action and reasoning used
by the Fifth Circuit in Flanagan and contrasts it to the Court’s prior settlement class
action decision in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor to conclude that the settlement
class action in Flanagan was proper and should have been allowed to stand.  See infra
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settlement class action structure that established an administrative
proceeding through which victims of asbestos exposure could receive
compensation for their injuries.25  The principal issues before the
Supreme Court in Ortiz v. Fibreboard are whether the settlement class
action in Flanagan is properly certified as a limited fund under Rule
23(b)(1)(B) and whether using such a mandatory settlement class
action device in the mass tort context violates due process.  The
outcome of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ortiz will ultimately
impact upon the viability of the settlement class action as an
alternative to individual litigation.26
This Comment explores pertinent issues raised by the judicial
system’s use of settlement class actions to resolve mass tort claims,
including due process, ethical, and judicial management issues.  For
example, settlement class actions implicate victims’ constitutional due
process rights to retain individual control over their claims and not
be bound to litigation without meaningful consent.27  Settlement class
actions also provide fertile ground for collusion between defendants’
and plaintiffs’ counsel that can lead to a potential “sell-out” of the
victims of the mass tort,28 as well as cause an inappropriate conflict of
                                                 
Part III.C (analyzing the factual and legal distinction between Flanagan and Amchem).
As compared to Amchem, the Flanagan settlement class action met all the certification
standards necessary under FRCP Rule 23 and also complied with due process
concerns.  Unfortunately, the Court failed to consider much of what this Comment
focuses upon, as mentioned supra.  Specifically, the Court chose not to address the
due process issues and failed to provide clear guidelines for future settlement class
actions in the mass tort context.  Instead, the Court cried out again for Congress to
take action.  See id. at 2324 (“‘[T]he elephantine mass of asbestos cases’ . . . cries out
for a legislative solution.”); see also Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
598 (1997) (calling for a federal, legislative response to resolve the numerous
asbestos claims filed across the nation).  Although bills were introduced in Congress
in 1999 and referred to Committees, it still remains unclear whether such bills will
garner enough support to pass or whether they will fall to the wayside, as they have in
the past.  See generally, e.g., H.R. 1283, 106th Cong. (1999) (providing for “legal
standards and procedures for the fair, prompt, inexpensive, and efficient resolution
of personal injury claims arising out of asbestos exposure”).  Thus, although this
Comment was written prior to the Supreme Court handing down its decision in Ortiz,
its arguments remain the same and its historical evaluation of the settlement class
action device itself, as used in the mass tort context, remains pertinent to the issues
yet to be resolved by the Court.
24. 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998).
25. See id. at 670 (finding that the settlement class satisfied Rule 23’s
requirements and was properly certified as a “limited fund” class under Rule
23(b)(1)(B)).
26. See Joseph F. Rice, Objectors Seek Supreme Court Review of Ahearn Settlement,
16 PROD. LIAB. L. & STRATEGY 5 (1998) (characterizing the Flanagan settlement as
illustrative of the objective of tort law, which is to compensate victims for injuries
suffered).
27. See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 5, at 827-28 (arguing that settlement class actions
require adequate representation of future claimants by class action counsel and,
thus, implicate their due process rights).
28. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts:  When the
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interest.29  Finally, settlement class actions raise the question of
whether judges have exceeded their authority through active, rather
than passive, involvement in the case.30  This Comment analyzes these
issues in the context of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Flanagan.31  This
Comment also compares and distinguishes the Flanagan settlement
class action from the settlement class action rejected by the Supreme
Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor.32
Part I of this Comment discusses the origin and development of
the class action and, in particular, the evolution of the settlement
class action from its equitable roots.  Part II evaluates Amchem, a
pivotal case in recent legal jurisprudence concerning settlement class
actions.  Part III summarizes the procedural and factual background
of Flanagan and evaluates the structural attributes of that settlement
class action.  Part IV analyzes the Fifth Circuit’s rationale in Flanagan
and explores, among other issues, whether strict preservation of a
plaintiff’s due process rights impairs or benefits future victims of mass
torts.  Part V reflects on the impact and consequences of the
Supreme Court’s decision of Ortiz in the arena of mass tort litigation.
This Comment recommends that the Supreme Court should preserve
the settlement class action as a useful device to be used in mass tort
litigation by providing clearer procedural guidelines to strengthen
and sustain both the equity and integrity principles that support the
settlement class action.
I. BACKGROUND
The settlement class action is a judicial creation carved from the
                                                 
Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1198 (discussing issues raised by
plaintiffs’ counsel’s purported “sell-out” of claimants in settlement class actions when
defendants’ counsel approach plaintiffs’ counsel to commence settlement
negotiations).
29. See Cramton, supra note 5, at 832 (asserting that simultaneous representation
of both future claimants and present claimants by plaintiffs’ counsel produces
impermissible conflicts of interests).
30. Cf. Mary J. Davis, Toward the Proper Role for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 OR. L.
REV. 157, 224 (1998) (stating that jurors are extensively criticized for “helping”
plaintiffs and broadening rules of product liability); see also David Luban, Heroic
Judging in an Antiheroic Age, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2064, 2082 (1997) (stating that judges
favor settlement class actions because of the interest in disposing of the cases quickly
and, consequently, they “cannot be counted on to monitor the settlements with a
skeptical eye”).
31. 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), aff’g 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996),
cert. granted sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 524 U.S. 936 (1998).
32. 521 U.S. 591, 619-20 (holding that the settlement itself is a relevant
consideration when deciding whether a class action filed with a proposed settlement
should be certified under Rule 23, but emphasizing that Rule 23 requirements
“demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement context”).
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modern-day class action,33 which is currently governed by Rule 23.34
To understand both the overall purpose and current necessity of the
settlement class action, it is helpful to trace the historical roots of the
class action, the underlying reasons for its development, and the
eventual creation of Rule 23.35
A. Historical Development of Group Litigation
The class action traces its origin to twelfth century “group
litigation,” commonly known as “medieval group litigation.”36
Manorial, royal and ecclesiastical courts used group litigation to meet
varying social needs of the medieval culture that were primarily
political or religious in nature and often involved multiple litigants.37
For example, courts used group litigation to address issues arising
from social obligations or privileges accorded to different rural
groups, parishes, and guilds within the hierarchical-structured
medieval community.38  Today, class actions are used to meet societal
needs of an industrialized and capitalistic society, such as those
involving civil rights, financial, or economic interests.39  This
                                                 
33. See supra note 9 (discussing settlement class actions as an innovative response
to the mass tort crisis).
34. See supra note 11 (listing pertinent provisions of Rule 23 governing class
actions).
35. See Yeazell, supra note 17, at 687 (“The spectacle of the settlement
class . . . shows how little sense we can make of procedural rules if we fail to put them
in the context of their economic dynamics.”).
36. See id. at 688 (claiming that a twelfth century case, Martin v. Parishioners,
which involved a defendant class comprised of four representatives against whom a
parish rector brought suit claiming certain fees, is demonstrative proof that class
actions evolved from “medieval group litigation” roots).  Professor Yeazell argues that
while the majority of legal literature traces modern-day class actions only to the
seventeenth century, the roots of modern-day class actions actually extend much
further back to medieval group litigation.  See YEAZELL, supra note 10, at 25
(supporting his argument with accounts by historians of medieval English law).  In
particular, Professor Yeazell posits that examples of medieval group litigation contest
the assumption that the class action is a “distinctively modern phenomenon.” See id.
at 39.
37. See id. at 41-46, 57-58 (describing the economic and political structure of
medieval society that gave rise to varying types of collective suits).
38. Professor Yeazell claims that the “rural English agriculture and its
concomitant social organization” between 1200 and 1700 dictated the need for
representative group litigation.  See id. at 70 (suggesting that the durability of group
litigation is due to the fact that villages did not substantially change during the past
five centuries).  Specifically, the structure of “rural [English] village[s], [each] with
its manor(s) and parish,” impaired proper communication between villagers, which
subsequently affected their social and political status.  See id. at 41.  Thus, the
villagers, many of whom were villeins with relatively little freedom and power, came
to rely on collective representation to foster communication and strengthen the
already existing unity of social status between themselves.  See id. at 42, 46 (asserting
that social status and social organization circumstances  “lie at the heart of medieval
manor and parish [group] litigation”).
39. See Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms:  Reconceiving the
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comparative legal response to social context and ideology traces the
progressive development of the class action, which is used to address
societal needs associated with multiple litigants, from the medieval
era.40
The goals of the modern-day class action, however, diverge from
those of medieval group litigation.41  For example, present-day class
actions seek to address the problems of repetitive claims, the high
costs associated with individual litigation, and overcrowded court
dockets.42  The class action is also a method used to “alter the
relations of power between the group and its adversary.”43
Conversely, medieval courts used group litigation to enforce
“group-based norms” that arose from association with a particular
political or religious status.44  Many current benefits of the modern
class action, such as lower transaction costs, are not attributable to
medieval group litigation.45  “[T]he issues at stake in such litigation
                                                 
History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 222-26 (1990) (reviewing
Medieval Group Litigation, and summarizing Professor Yeazell’s theory that the
modern-day class action developed in response to changing social and economic
issues that accompanied industrialization and the entrepreneurial nature of society);
see also YEAZELL, supra note 10, at 39-40 (asserting that the evolution of the modern
day class action device over the past eight centuries was not a consistent and unified
development, but rather a fragmented and broken one).
40. See YEAZELL, supra note 10, at 5 (“[L]egal responses have . . . expressed a
reaction to the circumstances of . . . medieval guilds, seventeenth-century villagers,
eighteenth-century investors, nineteenth-century preachers, and twentieth-century
civil-rights groups.”).  But cf. Bone, supra note 39, at 227 (agreeing that social
circumstances helped to shape group litigation, but asserting that the social
“contextualist thesis” excludes the influential effects of legal ideology).
41. Professor Yeazell distinguishes medieval group litigation from modern-day
class actions by stipulating that medieval group litigation grew out of principles
significantly different from the principles underlying class actions today.  See YEAZELL,
supra note 10, at 39, 57 (stating medieval group litigation suits involved different
political ideologies and social circumstances than modern-day class action suits).
Although the social contexts of medieval group litigation and modern class actions
differ, one can still observe that representative litigation responds to current social
needs and circumstances.  See id. at 21 (positing that “[s]ocial context matters”
because “procedural rules take on different colors in the light of differing social
settings”).  Thus, one can argue that the evolution of the settlement class action is a
natural phenomenon that is responding to current societal needs, much as the
development of the class action suit has over the past eight centuries.  See id. at 39
(arguing that all cases must be understood in their social context).
42. See William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions:  Order Out of
Chaos, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 837, 837-38 (delineating both the objectives of mass tort
litigation and the hurdles that must be overcome to obtain such stated objectives).
43. See YEAZELL, supra note 10, at 57 (contrasting medieval group litigation and
modern class action and stating that group litigation did not have the power
rebalancing effect).
44. See id. at 46, 52 (describing how group litigation addressed the issues arising
from social status and organization in medieval life).
45. See id. at 57 (explaining the benefits of medieval group litigation and modern
class action in light of the fact that medieval group litigation involved a social group
whereas modern class action litigation merely involves a section of society that shows
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[do not] involve[] incidents of [political or social] status [as it did
with medieval group litigation, but] rather . . . claims of individual
right . . . .”46  Despite the different attributes or justifications for its
use, the class action finds its genesis in the medieval era.47  This
historical origin exists because group litigation bestowed upon
modern society a model of representative litigation that is not only
contributive, but at times necessary to meet the current judicial
problems of repetitive claims, high costs, and burdened dockets.48
In the seventeenth century, medieval group litigation,49 now known
as the “bill of peace,”50 began its express association with equitable
roots.  The English Courts of Chancery, as courts of equity, used the
“bill of peace” to permit representative parties of larger groups of
litigants with a joint interest to aggregate their claims and bring a
collective action before the court.51  The “bill of peace” served two
primary and equitable goals:  (1) to reduce multiple, and sometimes
unnecessary, litigation,52 and (2) to enable individuals to litigate
                                                 
a hypothesized interest).
46. Id.
47. See id. at 3 (noting English and American courts have reorganized group
litigants for eight hundred years and that class actions are merely the latest version).
48. See id. at 7 (stating that group litigation, although fundamentally different
from modern-day class actions, “bequeathed us forms of litigative representation that
we today find useful and in some respects essential”).
An Illinois Court of Appeals also made comparisons between historical group
litigation and modern class actions.  See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Life After Amchem:  The
Class Struggle Continues, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 390 (1998) (noting parallels
between medieval and modern uses of litigation).  The Court drew parallels between
the objectives of medieval group litigation and the modern-day class action and
stated “‘[n]o matter how refined, how revised, or how evolved this flashy import
becomes, the goal of the class action remains the same—justice for the lowly, the
tenants, the parishioners, the multitudes.’”  Id. (quoting Wood River Area Dev. Corp.
v. Germania Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 555 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (Ill. App. 1990)).
49. Professor Yeazell notes that “because the social and economic organization of
the Middle Ages persisted into the modern age, so did the litigative expression of
that organization.”  YEAZELL, supra note 10, at 69.  Again, Professor Yeazell stipulates
that the transformation of medieval group litigation to the seventeenth-century
chancery court cases, was rather shaky.  See id. at 136 (discussing the transition from
the medieval cases and modern class actions).  Nevertheless, there are sufficient
characteristics between group litigation, the seventeenth-century cases, and the
modern-day class action to advance the proposition that the class action traces back
to twelfth century litigation.  See id. (noting that seventeenth century cases form a
bridge between modern and medieval cases); see also Yeazell, supra note 17, at 690-93
(providing an overview of the changes accompanying group litigation from the
twelfth century until the seventeenth century).
50. Professor Yeazell defines the bill of peace as “a proceeding in which one
claiming a right might once and for all, vindicate it against repeated suits on similar
grounds.”  YEAZELL, supra note 10, at 24.
51. See generally COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE:  CASES AND MATERIALS 683 (7th
ed. 1997) (defining the “bill of peace” as a “procedural device utilized by the Courts
of Chancery to allow an action to be brought by or against representative parties”
after meeting certain qualifications).
52. See YEAZELL, supra note 10, at 218 (citing 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
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claims as a group that would be too difficult to litigate individually.53
Eventually, due process issues relating to group litigation
emerged.54  This emergence paralleled the shift in society “from a
rural, customary, agricultural world to one that is urban,
individualistic, entrepreneurial-capitalistic.”55  To address such
concerns, Chancellors scrutinized the representation of a group of
litigants more closely.56  In particular, they required litigants to tender
an explanation for litigating jointly rather than separately.57
Despite these due process issues, Chancellors continued to grant
permission for group litigation, often justifying the aggregation of
                                                 
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 148 (1836)) (discussing early recognition of the conflicting
purposes of the group action).
53. See id. (noting accessibility of adjudication as the second aim of group
litigation).  Professor Yeazell discusses and evaluates the subtle tension between these
two equitable goals.  Summarizing theories from Joseph Story’s Commentaries on
Equity Jurisprudence, he speculates that Story stumbled upon one of the most
axiomatic issues revolving around the use of class action suits today:
whether the function of the class action is to consolidate suits that would
otherwise be brought (and thus to reduce the caseload of the judiciary) or to
facilitate the bringing of suits that would otherwise not be brought because
the individual stakes are too small (and thus to increase the accessibility of
adjudication).
YEAZELL, supra note 10, at 218 (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE 148 (1836)).
These contrasting theories offer a potential explanation for the divergent views
towards settlement class actions.  If the objective of a class action suit is to lessen the
number of duplicative claims in the judicial system, then the settlement class action,
in the mass tort context, is an essential procedural tool because it reduces repetitive
claims.  Conversely, if the objective of a class action suit is to increase accessibility to
the judicial system, then the necessity of the settlement class action becomes
uncertain because mass tort claims are usually substantial enough to warrant
individual litigation.  See generally id. at 218-19 (discussing possible divergent purposes
of mass group litigation).
54. See Bone, supra note 39, at 223 (summarizing the Chancellors’ concerns
about issues involving consent and adequate representation); see also Yeazell, supra
note 17, at 692 (musing about Lord Nottingham’s, known as “the parent of modern
equity,” approach to adequate representation where Lord Nottingham required the
representative parties to have sufficient authority to sue in the name of the rest of the
group and to be accountable for the costs of the suit).
55. YEAZELL, supra note 10, at 165 (emphasis added).
56. Professor Yeazell uses two cases to illustrate the emergence of due process
related issues.  First, Professor Yeazell discusses Brown v. Vermuden, a seventeenth-
century group litigation case in which the Chancellor dismissed a due process claim
and instead focused exclusively upon the goal of efficiency.  See Yeazell, supra note
17, at 691 (citing Brown v. Vermuden, 22 Eng. Rep. 796, 797 (Ch. 1676) and noting if
group suits were not allowed, some types of cases would be impossible to end).
Professor Yeazell then discusses Chancey v. May, an eighteenth-century group
litigation case in which the Chancellor expresses dislike for representative suits that
bind absent members of the class.  See id. at 693 (citing Chancey v. May, 24 Eng. Rep.
264 (Ch. 1722) and noting that the Chancellor felt that litigation that binds absent
parties is at best a poor solution to an otherwise insoluble problem).
57. See id. at 690 (noting that by 1700 courts checked the credentials of the group
litigants and required justification for allowing the suit to be brought collectively).
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claims because of its suitability and efficiency.58  Thus, the face of
group litigation changed and evolved into the current form of the
modern-day class action.59  Along with this evolution, however, came
increasing concerns over adequate representation and notice that
often conflicted with the goals of expediency and equity.60
B. Promulgation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23
The evolution of group litigation, which paralleled changing social
conditions, culminated in the statutory creation of Rule 23.61  The
“bill of peace” and the idea of group litigation permeated Anglo-
American law as it emerged from English common law.62  In the late
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court promulgated Federal Equity
Rule 4863 which, for the first time, expressly provided for “group
representative litigation.”64  Federal Equity Rule 48, however, was a
provision used infrequently.65  Thus, in 1912, the Supreme Court re-
formulated Equity Rule 48, which resulted in the creation of Equity
Rule 38.66  Equity Rule 38 simply stated “that where the parties were
too numerous for joinder, a few could sue or defend on behalf of the
rest.”67  Hence, Federal Equity Rule 48 was the predecessor to Rule
23.
                                                 
58. See id. at 691-93 (noting that expediency and necessity were two reasons
Chancellors permitted group litigation).
59. See id. at 693-94 (noting that chancery cases like Chancey provide modern
justifications for group litigation and that it is easy to parallel the needs of that time
to modern needs).
60. See id. at 643 (noting the manner in which the competing concerns of
represented interests and efficiency collide even in the modern action).
61. See COUND ET AL., supra note 51, at 683 (noting that in 1938 the equitable “bill
of peace” and the class action evolved further with the creation of Rule 23).
62. See Cabraser, supra note 48, at 379 (asserting that Rule 23 “has its deepest
roots in English equity practice”).
63. Federal Equity Rule 48 stated in pertinent part:
Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot, without
manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought
before it, the court in its discretion may dispense with making all of them
parties, and may proceed in the suit, having sufficient parties before it to
represent all the adverse interests of the plaintiffs and the defendants in the
suit properly before it.  But in such cases the decree shall be without
prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties.
FED. R. EQ. 48 (provided in 42 U.S. (1 How.) xIii, Ivi (1843)).
64. See YEAZELL, supra note 10, at 221 (commenting on the Supreme Court’s
promulgation of a set of equity rules, one of which was Equity Rule 48, which
provided for group representation).
65. See id. (“The Supreme Court promulgated a rule that permitted group
litigation but made it an exercise in futility.”).
66. See id. at 225 (discussing the reformulation as part of an overall revision of
the equity rules, but claiming that the re-formulation of Equity Rule 48 into Equity
Rule 38 failed to define group litigation in better terms).
67. Id.
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In 1938, the promulgation of the FRCP gave rise to the modern-day
class action and Rule 23.68  Rule 23 in its original form proved
inadequate because it lacked clear and workable guidelines.69  The
Rule’s vagueness resulted in infrequent, inefficient, and at times,
inappropriate uses of the class action.70  In response to these
problems, in 1966 the advisory committee modified Rule 23 to
provide lawyers and courts with clearer guideposts and procedures
for using and certifying class actions.71
Following the premise that social issues involving multiple litigants,
such as medieval political or religious obligations, influenced and
molded group litigation as it progressed,72 it is worth noting the
overriding “spirit” of the FRCP.  Rule 1 states that the Rules “shall be
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.”73  Controversy over the use of class
actions under Rule 23, especially settlement class actions, often arises
where the “spirit” of the FRCP and the principles of due process,
namely adequate representation and notice, intersect.74  Nevertheless,
                                                 
68. See COUND ET AL., supra note 51, at 683 (recognizing that the Equity Rules
influenced the shape of Rule 23, but asserting that the 1938 promulgation of the
Rule 23, and the 1966 revision, endeavored to create a more refined model of the
class action).
69. See Bone, supra note 39, at 225 (describing the initial promulgation of Rule
23 as conceptual and often misunderstood by both the courts and legal
commentators).
70. In his account of group litigation, Professor Yeazell focuses upon Hansberry v.
Lee, which, although not even litigated under Rule 23, “constitutionalized
individualism” in America and simultaneously stagnated the development of the class
action device for 30 years.  See YEAZELL, supra note 10, at 237 (citing Hansberry v. Lee,
311 U.S. 32 (1940), and noting that Hansberry involves issues of restrictive covenants
and racial discrimination).
71. See YEAZELL, supra note 10, at 238 & n.2 (discussing the advisory committee’s
changes to Rule 23 in 1966 to replace the conceptual categories, which were the
“true,” “hybrid,” and “spurious” classifications, with more practical terms); see also
Yeazell, supra note 17, at 695-96 (characterizing Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527
(1881), a case that involved the “common fund doctrine,” as “the engine for the
modern class action [and] the 1966 revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
[as] the wheels”).
72. See supra Part I.A (summarizing the theory that social context has influenced
and shaped group litigation).
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added).
74. See Greer Pagan, Comment, Renewed Resistance?:  The Federal Circuit Courts and
the Problem of Mass Tort Class Actions, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 807, 808 (1997) (recognizing
that the judicial system strives to eliminate obstacles that contribute to inefficiency,
but that these efforts often conflict with due process rights, such as individual control
over one’s case).
Several commentators rely heavily upon the mandate in Rule 1 to provide “just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action,” FED. R. CIV. P. 1, as
justification for settlement class actions.  See, e.g., Edley & Weiler, supra note 1, at 401-
06 (discussing the benefits to both plaintiffs and defendants of using settlement class
actions); Rice & Davis, supra note 2, passim (noting the failure of the courts to meet
the Rule 1 requirement and claiming the only solution is the settlement class action);
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it is the spirit of Rule 1 that shapes the current goals of the class
action and helps to define society’s current judicial need for group
litigation:75  an alternative to individual litigation that allows victims of
mass tort injuries to achieve compensation for their injuries fairly,
quickly, and inexpensively.76
C. Evolution of the Settlement Class Action from Roots of Equity
By tracing the development of the class action, it becomes
apparent that the creation of the settlement class action from Rule 23
finds its historical roots in equity.77  The evolution of Rule 23 and the
goals of the FRCP also explain the eventual creation of the settlement
class action as a response to the social and judicial needs of multiple
                                                 
Schwarzer, supra note 42, at 840-41 (noting the settlement class action can help with
burgeoning dockets, provide just results for plaintiffs waiting in line, and allow
defendants to manage liabilities); cf. John Gibeaut, At the Crossroads, 84 A.B.A. J. 60,
61 (1998) (noting that supporters say that ADR is the only fair and effective way to
dispose of thousands of claims that can flow from a mass tort).  Other legal scholars
and commentators choose instead to focus upon the preservation of constitutional
due process rights as the reason for denouncing the use of settlement class actions in
the arena of mass torts.  See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 8, at 1453-57 (noting the one-
sided weakness of the settlement class action and that they should only be adopted as
a temporary solution); Henderson, supra note 3, passim (claiming the settlement class
action is inappropriate because they place the power with the powerful to the
detriment of the individual).
75. See Manuel L. Real, What Evil Have We Wrought:  Class Action, Mass Torts, and
Settlement, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437, 437 (1998) (discussing how Rule 1 as well as Rule
23 provide guidance for defining the complete question of how to resolve mass tort
litigation); see also Linda S. Mullinix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case:  A Proposed
Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1039, 1048 (1986) (noting judicial use of class
action to be consonant with the requirements of Rule 1).
76. See T. Dean Malone, Comment, Castano v. American Tobacco Co. and Beyond:
The Propriety of Certifying Nation Wide Mass-Tort Class Actions Under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 23 When the Basis of the Suit is a “Novel” Claim or Injury, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 817,
817 (1997) (noting that several arguments support the use of the large class action as
an alternative means of assuring fairness to the plaintiffs).  The question raised by
the Rules Enabling Act relative to using the settlement class action device in the mass
tort context is outside the scope of this Comment.  The Rules Enabling Act, which
governs federal judicial rulemaking, mandates that “[s]uch rules shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right.”  See Appendix B, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)
(1994).  For a thorough discussion on the Rules Enabling Act and its relation to
settlement class actions, see generally Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the
Proposed Rule 23 Class Action Amendments, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 617 (1997)
(commenting that “[t]he generalized Rules Enabling Act argument is inherently
unresolvable”).
77. See Yeazell, supra note 17, at 703-04 (claiming that the settlement-only class
action “returns group litigation to its historical roots, as an engine that could be used
by—but also against—unincorporated persons” and theorizing its potential as a “real
procedural tool”); see also Cabraser, supra note 48, at 378 (stating that the modern-
day class action is rooted in equity); Schwarzer, supra note 42, at 841 (“In the mass
tort settlement context, then, the class action is becoming a creature that resembles a
cross between an equity receivership and a bill of peace.”).  But see Cramton, supra
note 5, at 812 (insinuating that settlement class actions, “which contain a novel
combination of features, illustrate something quite new in degree and kind”).
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litigants exposed to mass torts.78  Since 1966, plaintiffs, defendants,
lawyers, and court systems have manipulated Rule 23 to
accommodate the increase in mass tort litigation, especially for claims
involving asbestos exposure.79  This use of Rule 23 has enabled the
judicial system to provide large numbers of mass tort victims with an
alternative to traditional individual litigation of a claim.80  Still, it is
unlikely that the original drafters of Rule 23 envisioned that the
judicial system would use Rule 23 in this fashion.81
Although Rule 23 contains no provision expressly providing for
settlement class actions,82 plaintiffs and defendants commonly use it
for this purpose.  This use of Rule 23 has led critics to argue that the
rule is abused.83  A number of reasons, however, have created the
need to use settlement class actions to resolve mass tort claims:84  lack
of congressional action to resolve the growing number of outstanding
tort claims;85 repeated litigation with inherent costs and prolonged
delays imposed upon the court system;86 and exorbitant transaction
costs.87  Thus, the settlement class action allows mass tort victims to
                                                 
78. See Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 3, at 828 n.3 (noting that, over time,
courts have increasingly used class actions to avoid duplicative litigation, primarily
through settlement class actions).
79. See id. at 828 (noting how the rule has been stretched to meet the demands of
modern complex litigation, but also depicting the settlement class action as being on
the outskirts of Rule 23).
80. See id. at 829 (describing the typical settlement class action context and
noting that they are generally designed as an alternative to litigation).
81. See Yeazell, supra note 17, at 699 (noting that the drafters probably envisioned
use of Rule 23 in situations involving serious injury resulting from one catastrophic
event, such as an airplane crash, rather than the current and more common use of
Rule 23 to certify class actions involving serious injuries occurring over extended
periods of time, resulting from various exposures to chemicals or toxins); see also
Schwarzer, supra note 42, at 838-39 (asserting that the drafters of Rule 23 never
intended for the rule to encompass mass tort litigation).
82. See Aldock & Wyner, supra note 4, at 906 (noting that much of the criticism
revolves around the questionable permissibility of settlement class actions under the
terms of Rule 23); see also supra Part I (discussing the background of the settlement
class action and its evolvement from Rule 23).
83. See Aldock & Wyner, supra note 4, at 905-06 (noting use of Rule 23 for
settlement class actions and discussing concerns and questioning the permissibility of
using class actions, particularly settlement class actions, to resolve mass tort claims).
84. See Cramton, supra note 5, at 817-18 (citing judicial delay, high transaction
costs, minimal compensation payments to victims, escalating attorney fees, repetitive
trials, and “inevitable interrelationship among claimants” as factors, among others,
that have pressured lawyers and courts to aggregate and settle sprawling claims
involving mass torts); see also Schwarzer, supra note 42, at 837-38 (listing the problems
plaguing mass tort litigation).
85. See Linda S. Mullenix, Federalizing Choice of Law for Mass-Tort Litigation, 70 TEX.
L. REV. 1623, 1632 (1992) (discussing the lack of congressional action toward
substantive mass-tort legislation).
86. See Cramton, supra note 5, at 817 (discussing the burden on the courts of
duplicative individual trials).
87. See id. (noting complex, difficult cases of mass tort exposure present
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receive fair, quick and inexpensive resolution of their claims.88
Due to the increased use by defendants’ counsel89 and lack of clear
procedural guidelines to which courts should adhere when handling
settlement class actions, critics of the settlement class action will
continue to grow in number.90  The guideposts of equity and the
desire to compensate the wrongfully injured victim, however, lend
support to the continued use of settlement class actions,91 as
exemplified in Flanagan.92
II. AMCHEM PRODUCTS, INC. V. WINDSOR:  SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
ON SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS
To understand the Fifth Circuit decision in Flanagan, a review of
recent case law and its subsequent impact on settlement class actions
is necessary.  Although several recent decisions have dealt with and
                                                 
problems of high transaction costs because of difficult fault and causation
requirements).
88. Settlement class actions also fill the void of noticeably absent legislative action
in the mass tort arena.  See Edley & Weiler, supra note 1, at 400-01 (commenting that
legislative action is unlikely and “beyond the realm of the politically possible” and
subsequently urging the judicial system to respond to the mass tort crisis, especially
asbestos, “with imagination and urgency”).  But see David L. Shapiro, Class Actions:
The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 951 & n.7 (1998)
(suggesting that the legislature, not the judicial system, should promulgate change
relating to federal law governing mass torts and that a majority of commentators
support this consensus, and that the judiciary should not take over the task simply
because political pressure has made the legislature incapable of acting).  The current
debate over whether there should be legislative response versus judicial action to the
current crisis surrounding mass tort litigation is discussed briefly in note 189.
89. See Yeazell, supra note 17, at 700 (noting that the use of class actions by
plaintiffs’ lawyers have had the effect of also increasing the development of
defendant classes).  The return of the defendant class has effectively restored the
device to its historical roots.  See id. (postulating that plaintiffs’ use of settlement class
actions allows the class action to be a procedural tool that is really a defendant class
that can be used both for and against a plaintiff class).
90. See Aldock & Wyner, supra note 4, at 906 (noting that there has been a “rising
tide of criticism” over the use of settlement class actions in the mass tort context).
91. For example, Judge Weinstein discusses the significance of equitable
principles in current mass tort litigation:
[c]ourts of equity traditionally have taken into account the equities—the
concrete issues of fact and fairness of the particular situation-in fashioning
remedies.  In the mass tort context, these include (1) fairly and expeditiously
compensating numerous victims and (2) deterring wrongful conduct where
possible while (3) preventing overdeterrence in mass torts from shutting
down industry or removing needed products from the market, (4) keeping
the courts from becoming paralyzed by tens or even hundreds of thousands
of repetitive personal injury cases, and (5) reducing transactional costs of
compensation.
JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION:  THE EFFECT OF
CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 125 (1995).
92. 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,
524 U.S. 936 (1998).
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rejected the settlement class action,93 Amchem impacts most
significantly upon the Flanagan decision.
A. Importance of Amchem
On June 25, 1997, the Supreme Court decided the leading case in
settlement class action law:94  Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor.95  The
Court in Amchem held that the concept of the settlement itself is an
important consideration during the certification process,96 a process
where the court decides whether the proposed settlement class action
meets the requirements set forth in Rule 23.97  The Court also
carefully noted, however, that such settlement class actions may
actually require greater scrutiny because the court will not have the
opportunity to witness the case unfold in a judicial proceeding.98  The
Amchem decision is meaningful because it explicitly allows courts to
consider the structure, attributes, benefits, and disadvantages of the
settlement when deciding whether to certify the settlement class
action.99  Consequently, the Supreme Court further developed the
possibility that  judges and lawyers could use settlement class actions
as a viable alternative to individual litigation to handle mass tort
claims.
                                                 
93. Recent court decisions refusing certification of class actions, particularly
settlement class actions, strongly implies that federal courts are disinclined to
approve settlement class actions in the mass tort context.  See, e.g., Castano v.
American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (denying certification of a class
consisting of nicotine-dependent individuals); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up
Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
824 (1996) (reversing certification of a settlement class action involving product
defect claims); In re Stucco Litig., 175 F.R.D. 210 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (refusing
certification of a settlement class composed of homeowners); Walker v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 226 (S.D. W. Va. 1997) (rejecting a settlement filed as a
limited fund under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) that involved smoking-related claims); In re
Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332 (D.N.J. 1997)
(refusing certification of a class alleging a product defect).  But see Elkins v. Equitable
Life Ins. Co., No. Civ.A.96-296-Civ-T-17B, 1998 WL 133741 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 1998)
(approving of a proposed settlement involving claims of insurance fraud); Small v.
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 668 N.Y.S.2d 307 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (certifying a settlement
class that involved smoking-related injuries).
94. See Aldock & Wyner, supra note 4, at 905 (commenting that the Supreme
Court dealt with settlement class action law for the first time in Amchem).
95. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
96. See id. at 619 (holding that “settlement is relevant to a class certification,” yet
warning that potential settlement class actions may require more in-depth scrutiny
than class actions filed for litigation purposes).
97. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) & (b) (defining both the prerequisites for a suitable
class action and the factual determinations that must be considered in deciding class
maintenance).
98. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620-21.
99. See id. at 622 (reversing, in a limited context, the lower court’s holding that
the attributes of the settlement should not be considered during the certification
process, but finding that a remand of the case was not necessary).
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The Supreme Court, however, simultaneously made it more
difficult for courts to approve settlement class actions by ruling out
certain types of settlement structures.100  The Court also failed to
clearly articulate the attributes of a settlement that are appropriate,101
making Amchem uncertain precedent for future settlement class
actions.  The settlement class action in Amchem was structured as an
alternative dispute resolution102 (“ADR”) to resolve all outstanding
asbestos tort claims against a group of defendant manufacturers.103
The Court stated that this particular settlement structure did not
meet the mandatory requirements set forth in Rule 23(b)(3).104
Moreover, the settlement class action did not provide for adequate
representation of the plaintiff class,105 a crucial due process protection
for the plaintiff class and a requirement under Rule 23(a).106
Therefore, the Court de-certified the Amchem global settlement filed
under Rule 23(b)(3), although it found that settlement was a
pertinent consideration to the certification process.107
B. Supreme Court’s Reasons for De-Certifying Amchem
The global settlement in Amchem, which sought to bind both
present claims and future claims not yet in litigation,108 contained
                                                 
100. See id. at 624 (finding that certification of classes, such as the one before the
Court, can not be approved under Rule 23(b)(3) because it encompassed a class that
was too large and “sprawling”); see also Kenneth J. Ashman, Class Action Settlements
After ‘Amchem’, 218 N.Y. L.J. 1 (1997) (noting Amchem has made it tougher for future
settlement class actions to obtain certification under Rule 23).
101. The Supreme Court vaguely suggests that cases involving mass tort claims of
such proportions “resort to less bold aggregation techniques, including more
narrowly defined class certifications.”  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 629 (quoting Georgine v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (1996)).  But see Green, supra note 12, at 1778 n.17
(commenting that the Supreme Court’s recommendation to utilize “‘less bold
aggregation techniques’” provides unhelpful guidance “at best and cruelly
disempower[s] and dismiss[es] . . . workers’ health, safety, and welfare interests at
worst”) (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 629).
102. See generally Gibeaut, supra note 74, at 60-62 (discussing ADR as a means of
resolving outstanding asbestos mass tort claims efficiently).
103. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 599-601 (summarizing events leading up to a global
settlement that would provide “a workable administrative system for the handling of
future [asbestos] claims”) (citing Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246,
270 (E.D. Pa. 1994)).
104. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624-25 (finding the settlement class did not meet
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)).  Rule 23(b)(3) states in part that
“questions of law or fact common to the members of the class [must] predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
105. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625 (finding that the class representatives did not
meet Rule 23(a)(4)’s requirement of adequate representation).
106. See id. at 626 n.20 (requiring that “the plaintiff’s claim and class claim are so
interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately
protected in their absence.”).
107. See id. at 624.
108. See id. at 595, 605 (the settlement class sought to bind those class members
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several deficiencies109 that ultimately led to its de-certification.
Adequate representation problems proved to be the most
detrimental.110  For example, plaintiffs’ counsel represented present
claimants (“inventory plaintiffs”) while simultaneously representing
future claimants with whom no actual attorney-client relationship
existed.111  In addition, inventory plaintiffs’ claims were settled
separately and prior to any agreement concerning future claimants,
indicating a possible “sell out” of the future claimants’ interests.112
Finally, nine plaintiffs alleging varying exposure levels to asbestos
represented a global class of future claimants that did not consist of
any sub-classes.113
On these facts, the Supreme Court found that the Amchem
settlement structure did not provide adequate representation for the
plaintiff class, and thus failed to comply with the due process
protections afforded plaintiffs by Rule 23.114  Consequently, in the
                                                 
exposed to asbestos products produced by defendants, that did not file suit before
January 15, 1993).
109. Some of the other deficient characteristics of the settlement structure that
the Court in Amchem discussed, but did not necessarily elaborate upon were:  the
settlement agreement established four compensable disease categories with a cap on
how many ‘exceptional’ claims (those that did not fall within the four categories) the
defendant class would have to cover; for claims relating to the four categories, a
range of damages was established with no ability to adjust for inflation and with
different categories able to receive different levels of compensation; a cap was placed
on how many claims the defendant class would be liable for in a given year; certain
claims were excluded, regardless of the fact that under state tort law they could
possibly receive compensation; only a limited number of class plaintiffs per year
would be able to elect pursuing their claims in court rather than being bound by the
settlement, and moreover, could not claim punitive damages if they did elect trial.
See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 603-06.
110. See id. at 628 (holding that because the class requirements of common issue
predominance and adequacy of representation could not be met, there was no need
to give a definitive ruling on notice).
111. See id. at 600-01 (outlining the proposed settlement’s process for the
administration of liability payments to both present and future claimants).
112. See id. (expressing the court’s cynicism towards the proposed settlement
process).
113. See id. at 602-03 (“The complaint delineated no subclasses; all named
plaintiffs were designated as representatives of the class as a whole.”).
114. See id. at 623-25 (affirming the circuit court’s decision to de-certify the class).
The Supreme Court also held that the global settlement constructed in Amchem did
not meet the Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.  See id. at 622-23 (“The
predominance requirement stated in Rule 23(b)(3), we hold, is not met by the
factors on which the district court relied.”).  The Court cited several factors to
support the conclusion that the settlement class did not meet the predominance
requirement, but focused on two in particular.  See id. at 624-25 (citing differences in
state law as one factor that contributes to class disparity).  First, the global class
contained numerous factual disparities.  See id. (citing different medical histories and
length of exposure times as disparate facts that weaken the unity of the class).
Second, the interests of the named plaintiff representatives did not align with the
interests of the global class members.  See id. at 624 (describing the class as
“sprawling” and incapable of sharing sufficient common interests with the class
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form presented to the Court, the settlement class action could not
proceed.115  In short, the Court stated that even in the settlement class
action context, courts must strictly adhere to the requirements
established by Rule 23(a) and (b), regardless of how fairly the
settlement treats class members.116  The Court did, however,
recognize petitioners’ argument that the global settlement provided
for a “secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims,” but
insinuated that such a procedure should find its legitimacy through
legislative action, not judicial intervention.117
C. Impact of Amchem on Future Settlement Class Actions
The Amchem decision represents the Supreme Court’s intent to
                                                 
representatives).  These two factors, therefore, precluded the settlement class action
from meeting the predominance requirement.
Although the predominance issue was significant for the Amchem settlement class
action, it was much less relevant for the Flanagan settlement class action.  See
Flanagan v. Ahearn, 134 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 1998) (validating a district court’s
holding that approved a settlement class action of asbestos claims).  Flanagan was
filed under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) as a limited fund, which has no predominance
requirement, only a commonality or typicality requirement as set forth by Rule
23(a)(4).  See id. at 670 (comparing Flanagan to Amchem); see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at
623 n.19 (noting that a settlement class action filed under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) need
not provide that common issues predominate over individual issues) (citing
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 318 (E.D. Pa. 1994)).
115. See Amchem, 117 U.S. at 629 (affirming the lower court’s decision to de-certify
the settlement class action).
116. The Supreme Court found that, without strict adherence to Rule 23(a) and
(b)(3) and absent a trial, a global settlement agreement may have unfair and
unanticipated consequences.  The Supreme Court stated that:
The safeguards provided by the Rule 23(a) and (b) class-qualifying
criteria . . . are not impractical impediments—checks shorn of utility—in the
settlement-class context. . . .  [T]he standards set for the protection of absent
class members serve to inhibit appraisals of the chancellor’s foot kind-class
certifications dependent upon the court’s gestalt judgement or overarching
impression of the settlement’s fairness.
Id. at 621.
117. See id. at 628-29.  A great number of commentaries focus on the highly
sensitive issue of judicial involvement and the proper role of judges in resolving the
problems surrounding mass tort litigation.  See generally Carrington & Apanovitch,
supra note 12, at 461 (asserting that in the context of settlement class actions
concerning mass tort litigation, “[i]t is time to recall that the judicial power of the
United States has limits”); Henderson, supra note 3, at 1020 (asserting that in the
settlement-only class action context, “judges are directly and personally benefited by
their approvals of the ‘done deals’ between the defendants’ and plaintiffs’ counsel”
and therefore, demoralize the entire adjudication process); Lamberth, supra note 18,
at 164-65 (arguing that regardless of the strain placed upon the court system by the
growing number of filed mass tort claims, judges do not have the authority nor the
ability to provide an adequate solution).  But see Rice & Davis, supra note 2, at 146
(arguing that due to the lack of adequate procedural devices to contend with mass
tort litigation, “the only resolution in sight is through effective class action
settlements within the procedural strictures laid out by the courts”).  For additional
comments on this subject, see infra note 189, which discusses the current debate over
legislation versus judicial management of mass tort litigation.
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protect plaintiffs’ constitutional due process rights,118 regardless of
how efficient, fair, or inexpensive the settlement class action
appears.119  The decision also reflects the Court’s belief that it is vital
for a plaintiff to retain individual control over claims that are serious
enough to warrant individual litigation.120  But critics of settlement
class actions should heed the Court’s cogent observation in Amchem:
that application of Rule 23 as a corrective measure to mass tort issues
is imperiled as much by those who are disinclined to using it as by
those who are too eager to use it.121
Regardless of the Court’s intent, the significance of Amchem rests
principally on the Court’s holding that settlement is a pertinent
consideration during the class certification process.122  Therefore, the
implications of the Amchem decision are at once vague, but still
poignant for future settlement class actions.123  It is now accepted that
when a class action is presented for settlement-only purposes, the
requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) will receive increased scrutiny.124
Despite this heightened level of scrutiny, there still exists a strong
possibility that similarly constructed global settlements could proceed
under alternative subsections of Rule 23 and meet with the Court’s
                                                 
118. See Cabraser, supra note 48, at 373 (postulating that the Amchem decision is
heralded by advocates of victims’ due process rights as a divine intervention that has
“spare[d] the ‘unselfconscious and amorphous legions’ of asbestos victims and their
families”) (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 628).
119. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 622-23 (stating that the advantages resulting from an
administrative compensation structure are not relevant to the determination of
whether the predominance requirement, which ensures due process under Rule
23(b)(3), has been met).
120. See id. at 625 (recommending greater caution during the certification process
of a proposed settlement class actions when “individual stakes are high”); cf. YEAZELL,
supra note 10, at 13–14 (observing that the idea of individualism is pervasive
throughout American law, and as a result, strongly influences the debate over
representative litigation and its binding effects).
121. The Court took special care to note that “the rulemaker’s prescriptions for
class actions may be endangered by ‘those who embrace [Rule 23] too
enthusiastically just as [they are by] those who approach [the rule] with distaste.’”  Amchem,
521 U.S. at 629 (quoting CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 508
(5th ed. 1994)) (emphasis added).
122. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 619-20.  The Court also held that Rule 23(b)(3)(D),
which governs the inquiry as to whether litigation as a class would cause “intractable
management” concerns, is not a relevant inquiry for settlement class actions because
litigation of the suit is not anticipated.  See id. at 620.
123. See Green, supra note 12, at 1776 (commenting that the Supreme Court sent
a “mixed message” through its first decision concerning the viability of settlement
class actions by showing distrust towards settlement class actions in the mass tort
context, but not outright denouncing their use or necessity).
124. See Aldock & Wyner, supra note 4, at 913-20 (discussing the implications of
the Amchem decision and noting the greater scrutiny with which lower courts will
have to review future settlement class actions); see also Barry F. McNeil & Beth L.
Fancsal, Mass Torts and Class Actions:  Facing Increased Scrutiny, 167 F.R.D. 483, 509-11
(1996) (noting the increased scrutiny given to settlement class action suits after
Amchem and speculating that closer judicial scrutiny will follow).
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approval.125
If this possibility proves untrue, however, Amchem may have single-
handedly halted the development of the settlement class action.  This
would imply reversal of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Flanagan,126
discussed more fully in the following section.127  Therefore, the
following section examines the circumstances under which the
Flanagan settlement class action developed.128  The discussion then
focuses on the pertinent attributes of the Flanagan settlement and
distinguishes it from the Amchem settlement class action.129
III. THE FLANAGAN V. AHEARN SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTION
A. Procedural History of Flanagan
Despite the desire to compensate thousands of asbestos claims in
an expedited manner, the litigation surrounding this case has a
history spanning over four years.130  The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas first certified the Flanagan settlement
class action in 1995.131  Objectors appealed, but the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the decision of the lower court.132  In two separate petitions,
objectors Flanagan and Ortiz again appealed to the Supreme Court
                                                 
125. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626-27 (noting several times that the settlement class
action was filed under Rule 23(b)(3) and therefore, distinguishable from settlement
class actions that proceed under different categories of Rule 23); see also John C.
Coffee, Jr., After the High Court Decision in ‘Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,’ Can a
Class Action Ever Be Certified Only for the Purpose of Settlement?, NAT’L L.J., July 21, 1997,
at B4 (noting that “alternative subsections of Rule 23 [may] permit sidestepping [of]
Amchem’s holding”); Fibreboard Settlement Approved by Court Panel, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3,
1998, at B6 (reporting that Flanagan v. Ahearn was governed under different rules
than Amchem and therefore, was legally distinct).
126. See 134 F.3d 668, 683 (5th Cir. 1998) (Smith, J., dissenting) (asserting that
the majority panel “casually dismisse[d] the teaching of Amchem and blesse[d] a class
that falls far short of legal and constitutional requirements”).
127. See infra Part III (discussing the Flanagan settlement class action in general).
128. See infra Part III.B (tracing the development of the settlement negotiations in
Flanagan).
129. See infra Part III.C (comparing the Flanagan and Amchem settlements).
130. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania initially decided the case in June of
1994.  See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(enjoining claimants, who failed to opt out of the class action, from filing separate
claims).  The scope of Amchem was argued and applied through the adjudication of
Flanagan v. Ahearn in January of 1998.  See 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding
certification of asbestos settlement class action).
131. See Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (certifying
the settlement class action filed with the court by the settling parties on August 27,
1993, under Rule 23(b)(1)).
132. See Flanagan v. Ahearn, 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming the lower
court’s decision to certify an asbestos settlement class action in holding that the
requirements of Rule 23 were satisfied), aff’g Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D.
505 (E.D. Tex 1995), reh’g en banc denied, 101 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1997)[hereinafter
“Flanagan I”].
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in 1997.133
On June 27, 1997, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated,
and remanded the petitions for certiorari for reconsideration in light
of Amchem.134  After receiving additional briefs and hearing oral
arguments from the principal parties involved, the Fifth Circuit
reaffirmed its prior decision to certify the filed settlement class action
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).135  In February 1998, two separate groups of
petitioners, Flanagan and Ortiz, again filed petitions of certiorari to
the Supreme Court.136  The petitions asserted that the Fifth Circuit
ignored the Court’s holding in Amchem and disregarded the
constitutional protections afforded to the class members.137  On June
22, 1998, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Flanagan for the
second time.138
B. Circumstances Leading to the Flanagan Settlement
The principal parties involved in Flanagan constructed the
settlement class action as a response to unusual circumstances.139
These circumstances could have potentially destroyed the ability of
numerous future claimants to obtain compensation for their asbestos-
related injuries.140
Fibreboard Corporation (“Fibreboard”) faced a number of
asbestos-exposure claims that far exceeded its then available $100
million in assets.141  Fibreboard also found itself in the midst of
insurance litigation with its two previous insurers, Pacific Indemnity
Company (“Pacific”) and Continental Casualty Company
                                                 
133. Both the Flanagan objectors and the Ortiz objectors filed petitions of
certiorari with the Supreme Court in 1997. See Flanagan v. Ahearn, 521 U.S. 1114
(1997) (Mem.), vacated and remanded in light of Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591 (1997); see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 521 U.S. 1114 (1997) (mem.),
vacated and remanded in light of Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
134. See infra note 136.
135. See Flanagan v. Ahearn, 134 F.3d 668, 669 (5th Cir. 1998)(2-1 per curiam),
(“After oral argument and reconsideration, we can find nothing in the Amchem
opinion that changes our prior decision.  We again affirm.”), aff’g 90 F.3d 963
(5th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter “Flanagan II”].
136. See supra note 21 (noting that both the Flanagan objectors and the Ortiz
objectors filed petitions of certiorari with the Supreme Court in 1998).
137. See id.
138. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 524 U.S. 936 (1998) (consolidating the
objectors’ petitions for certiorari).
139. See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 968-69 (summarizing how defendant’s insurance
suits played a role in the plaintiff’s settlement class action).
140. See id. at 970 (discussing the insurer’s willingness to participate in a global
settlement if the settlement brought “total peace” and the settlement class could not
opt out).
141. See id. at 968-69 (noting that although Fibreboard, a manufacturer of
asbestos, retained close to $100 million in assets at the outset of the case, it quickly
exhausted these funds due to litigation by the late 1980s).
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(“Continental”), to provide insurance coverage for outstanding
exposure claims.142  Unsure of the insurance litigation outcome,
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ counsel began negotiations for an
agreement that would secure compensation for victims of the
asbestos exposure.143
Although Fibreboard initially won the insurance litigation,
Continental appealed the court’s decision.144 Consequently,
settlement negotiations continued.145  When Continental finally
approached the settlement table, negotiations had commenced
already between Fibreboard, Pacific, and plaintiffs’ counsel.146  As a
prerequisite for its participation in the settlement talks, Continental,
whose insurance was necessary to compensate claims, demanded that
any agreed upon settlement be global and binding on all future
claimants.147
Settlement negotiations first revolved around issues relating to the
present claimants that plaintiffs’ counsel currently represented.148  On
the suggestion of the settlement facilitator,149 the parties negotiated
and finalized the settlement concerning the “inventory plaintiffs”150
before beginning in-depth negotiations regarding a settlement for
future claimants.151  Ongoing discussions between defendants’ and
plaintiffs’ counsel then culminated, with the assistance of Judge
                                                 
142. See id. at 968-71 (describing the pending insurance litigation between
Fibreboard, Pacific, and Continental).
143. See id. at 969-70 (realizing the risk that their clients may not receive sufficient
compensation for their claims if Continental won the insurance litigation, plaintiffs’
counsel was amicable to negotiations when Fibreboard approached them with the
suggestion of a global settlement).
144. See id. at 968-69 (identifying the extensive litigation between Fibreboard and
insurers from 1979-1993).
145. See id. at 971 (noting that the fact that “Fibreboard faced immediate
bankruptcy if it lost the coverage case” with Continental gave impetus to the global
settlement class that arose from intense negotiations).
146. See id. at 970 (“Continental knew that Fibreboard and plaintiffs’ counsel were
actively engaged in negotiating a global settlement to be funded with Continental’s
money.”).
147. See id. (detailing Continental’s arguments for a mandatory and global
settlement class action).
148. See id. at 971 (explaining that the parties agreed to the court’s
recommendation that the parties should attempt to settle the inventory of
approximately 45,000 present claims).
149. In February 1993, Judge Parker, sitting by designation, appointed Judge
Patrick E. Higgenbotham as the settlement facilitator, to aid the principal parties
throughout the settlement negotiations.  See id. at 970.  Judge Higgenbotham
suggested, for unstated reasons, that the parties first settle the claims of the inventory
plaintiffs’ claims.  See id. at 971.
150. The “Substitute Ness Motley Agreement” settled the 45,000 present claims,
which were called “inventory claims.”  See id.
151. See id. (“With the Ness Motley settlement behind them, the parties intensified
their efforts to reach a global settlement.”).
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Parker,152 in the creation of a $1.535 billion trust set up solely for the
future claimants.153
As a result of these negotiations, a global settlement class action
was eventually reached and filed154 as a “limited fund” under Rule
23(b)(1)(B).155  The “limited fund” category binds all necessary
parties156 and does not allow opt outs or provide notice to absent
members of the class.157  The “limited fund” is also an equitable tool
that permits for resolution of both duplicative and multiple claims
that could be dispositive of other claimants’ interests who are not
members of the class.158  This equitable attribute of the limited fund
aligns with FRCP’s mandate that there be “just, speedy, and
                                                 
152. See id. (describing the settlement negotiations that continued throughout the
evening of August 26, 1993, at Judge Parker’s residence, and then later, at a coffee
shop).
153. See id. (discussing plaintiffs’ initial refusal of the global settlement offer at
Judge Parker’s home, but eventual acceptance of the offer at the coffee shop).  The
future claimants were individuals with asbestos exposure-related claims against
Fibreboard.  See id.  These claimants neither filed suit nor settled their claims before
August 27, 1993.  See id. at 972.  This class was known as the “Global Health Claimant
Class.”  See id.
154. The Global Health Claimant Class settlement class action was filed on
September 9, 1993.  See id.
155. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) advisory committee’s notes.  Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
does not expressly provide for a “limited fund,” but the advisory committee notes of
1966 stated that the provision is useful where separate adjudication of each claim
would be dispositive of other claimants interests because of limited resources or an
insufficient fund.  See id.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Smith discussed this facet of Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
and asserted that Fibreboard, then a solvent corporation, artificially created limited
resources by capping compensation at the level that insurers Continental and Pacific
were able to pay.  See Flanagan II, 134 F.3d at 671-73 (Smith, J., dissenting).  Judge
Smith concluded that no limited fund existed and, therefore, the settlement class
action should have proceeded under Rule 23(b)(3).  See id. at 672 n.7 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).  The Advisory Committee, however, noted that “[s]imilar
problems . . . can arise in the absence of a fund either present or potential.”  FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) advisory committee notes (emphasis added).  This point is
significant for Flanagan because Fibreboard faced a potential limited fund of
insurance proceeds if it did not win its pending insurance coverage case against one
of its principal insurers, Continental.  See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 969 (stating that, even
with the Pacific agreement, “Fibreboard faced acute problems with increased large-
scale asbestos litigation”).
156. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) advisory committee notes.
157. Under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), neither notice nor an opt out provision, allowing
individuals to exclude themselves from the class, is required.  See FED. R. CIV. P.
23(c)(2)-(3) (making the requirements of notice and the opportunity to opt out
from the class applicable only to class actions filed under Rule 23(b)(3)).  Notice
and the opportunity to opt out can be granted in class actions filed under
subsections other than Rule 23(b)(3) at the discretion of the court.  See FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(d) (stating that the court, at its discretion, can implement certain orders).
158. See YEAZELL, supra note 10, at 256-57 (explaining that Rule 23(b)(1) is “an
instance of class action by necessity” to prevent inconsistent outcomes and “a way out
of a situation that would otherwise force the legal system into either futility or
contradiction”).
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inexpensive determination of every [claim],”159 and prevents
situations where persons would be compelled to race to the
courthouse for the greatest amount in damages.160
Certification of the settlement class action as a “limited fund”
generated criticism from dissenting Judge Jerry E. Smith, who
claimed that the class did not meet the requirements of Rule
23(b)(1)(B).161  Judge Smith asserted that because Fibreboard was
currently a solvent corporation, the settlement class action should have
been classified under Rule 23(b)(3).162  As discussed above, however,
Fibreboard faced impending bankruptcy if it failed to win its
insurance litigation with Continental and Pacific.163  If Fibreboard
lost, an otherwise solvent corporation would not only be unable to
compensate present claimants fully, but would also be unable to
fulfill any financial obligations to future claimants.164  In this context,
the settlement class action based upon a limited fund theory
represented the most viable solution to secure compensation for all
victims of asbestos exposure both fairly and equitably.165
C. Flanagan and Amchem:  The Factual and Legal Distinction
Perhaps observing the inherent limitation of Amchem,166 the Fifth
Circuit in Flanagan held that the settlement class action, filed as a
“limited fund” under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), met the requirements of
Rule 23 and therefore was properly certified.167  Nevertheless,
                                                 
159. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
160. See Edley & Weiler, supra note 1, at 392 (noting that the level of expenditures
involved with asbestos litigation is astronomical and difficult to quantify, but that of
the original twenty-five asbestos defendants, sixteen have filed bankruptcy already).
161. See Flanagan II, 134 F.3d at 671 (Smith, J., dissenting) (alleging that the
settlement agreement is what established the so-called “limited fund”).
162. See id. at 671 (“This issue alone should be dispositive of the matter, for if this
class cannot go forward as a ‘limited fund’ class, it would require certification under
[R]ule 23(b)(3) and would then be subject to the requirements of predominance
and superiority.”).
163. See supra Part III.B (discussing the circumstances leading to the Flanagan
settlement agreement).
164. See Rice, supra note 26, at 5 (asserting that without the Flanagan settlement
agreement, the prospect of future claimants receiving compensation for their claims
was minimal).
165. See id. (stating that the Flanagan settlement fulfilled both the objective of tort
law, to compensate injured victims, and the objective of the FRCP, to provide the
“just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every claim”) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
1).
166. See supra Part II.C (suggesting that Amchem was decided within the limited
scope of Rule 23(b)(3)).
167. See Flanagan II, 134 F.3d at 669-70 (“In our prior opinion, we affirmed the
judgment below, which approved the class action settlements of asbestos-related
claims involving Fibreboard Corporation. . . .  [W]e can find nothing in the Amchem
opinion that changes our prior decision.”).
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compared to Amchem, objectors have attacked Flanagan with equal, if
not greater, intensity.168  The objectors to Flanagan claim that the
settlement class action affirmed by the Fifth Circuit represents a
blatant disregard of the Supreme Court’s holding and rational in
Amchem.169
The objections to the Flanagan settlement class action are
unwarranted.  In addition to the unusual circumstances that led to
the settlement agreement,170 Flanagan also is legally and factually
distinct from Amchem.171  First, Flanagan was filed as a limited fund
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), where as Amchem was filed under Rule
23(b)(3).172  Consequently, Flanagan does not have to meet the
higher ‘predominance’ threshold, a requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)
and the central issue in Amchem.173  Instead, Flanagan must show only
that the proposed settlement class meets the commonality and
                                                 
168. See, e.g., Rex Bossert, Asbestos Case Deepens Rift in Fifth Circuit:  Judge Says
Colleagues Ignored the Supreme Court, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 16, 1998, at A6 (“The [panel
majority] is thumbing its nose at the Supreme Court.”) (quoting Linda S. Mullenix
of the University of Texas School of Law) (alteration in original).
169. See Flanagan II, 134 F.3d at 683 (Smith, J., dissenting) (asserting that “[t]he
panel majority embraces a settlement that it considers a triumph of
practicality . . . [and] casually dismisses the teaching of Amchem and blesses a class
that falls far short of legal and constitutional requirements”).
170. See supra Part III.B.
171. See Flanagan II, 134 F.3d at 669-70 (discussing briefly the differences between
the Amchem settlement class and the Flanagan settlement class).
172. See id. at 669.  For purposes of this Comment, it is assumed that the Flanagan
settlement class action was properly certified as a limited fund because of the
external pressures present before the settlement was reached.  See infra notes 182-86
and accompanying text (noting the possibility of inadequate funds by Fibreboard to
satisfy all of the claims); see also infra notes 252-55 and accompanying text (noting
that what constitutes a limited fund will be the cause of much future debate).  As
noted supra note 23, the Supreme Court actually found that the settlement class
action in Flanagan did not qualify as a limited fund and thus, reversed and remanded
the Fifth Circuit decision.  Interestingly, the Court refused to define the contours of
what would qualify as a limited fund and therefore, this still remains a debatable
issue.
There is criticism that Flanagan circumvented bankruptcy law by permitting
defendants to file as a limited fund, even though Fibreboard retained solvency.  See
id. at 671-74 (Smith, J., dissenting).  The Fifth Circuit, however, previously addressed
this issue with brevity, asserting that “[t]o the extent intervenors are arguing that
certification is improper because Fibreboard fares better under the class action
settlement than under a bankruptcy proceeding, we find their focus misplaced.  The
inquiry instead should be whether the class is better served by avoiding impairment
of their interests.”  Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 963, 985.
173. See Coffee, supra note 125, at 1, B4 (noting that the predominance inquiry of
Amchem will not be relevant to Flanagan).  But cf. Cohen, supra note 2, at 316
(recognizing that settlement class actions filed under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) do not have
to meet the higher “predominance” threshold present for class actions filed under
Rule 23(b)(3), but claiming that the commonality of the class interests under
mandatory class actions should be at least equivalent to those classes where absentees
have the right to opt out from the class).
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typicality requirements of Rule 23(a).174
Second, unlike Amchem, the claim of inadequate representation by
plaintiff class representatives is not asserted in Flanagan.175  Rather,
they directed their objection solely to the simultaneous
representation by plaintiffs’ counsel of both the present and future
claimants.176  Therefore, the objection to adequate representation in
Flanagan implicates ethical considerations rather than procedural
issues.177
Third, in Flanagan the Fifth Circuit appointed a guardian ad litem
on behalf of the future claimant class.178  The Fifth Circuit also
appointed Judge Higgenbotham, who oversaw all settlement
negotiations.179  These precautions taken by the Fifth Circuit in
Flanagan, but not present in Amchem,180 ensured that plaintiff’s
counsel adequately represented the future claimant class.
                                                 
174. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)-(3) (delineating the requirements applicable to
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action suits).
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the Flanagan settlement class action satisfied the
commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) & (3).  See Flanagan I,
90 F.3d at 979.  The Fifth Circuit listed the following as common interests of the
“Global Health Claimant Class”:
avoiding . . . catastrophic results of a loss by Fibreboard in the coverage case
appeal; maximizing the total settlement contribution from [defendants];
streamlining the procedures for the filing, processing, and resolution of
claims, thereby reducing transaction costs and delays in compensation;
minimizing the percentage of their compensation diverted from the fund to
pay attorney’s fees; and adopting procedures that provide for payments to
claimants in an equitable manner.
Id. at 981.  See generally Cohen, supra note 2, at 302 (asserting that the only conflict
between present and future claimants in Flanagan was the desire to control limited
funds to provide future claimants with monetary damages, but that this is the same
reason for certifying the class as a limited fund).
175. See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 976 n.10 (refraining from considering whether the
class representatives provided adequate representation because no objection to that
effect was lodged).
176. Because the objectors to the global settlement in Flanagan did not contest the
class representatives’ adequacy of representation, only the issue of whether counsel
adequately represented the class was present.  See id. at 976 (“Intervenors do not
challenge the adequacy of representation of class representatives so we do not
consider this issue.”).
177. See id. at 977-78 (discussing the legal ethics experts called by the intervenors
and settling parties to testify on the issue of whether class counsel adequately
represented the plaintiff class).  But see Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 626 n.20 (1997) (finding that inquiries relating to adequate representation
merge with the procedural questions of commonality and typicality found within
Rule 23(a)).
178. See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 972 (stating that Judge Parker appointed Professor
Eric D. Green, a Boston University Law Professor, as guardian ad litem for the future
claimant class).
179. See id. at 970 (“With the approval of the parties, Judge Parker named Judge
Patrick E. Higgenbotham of this court to serve as settlement facilitator.”).
180. No special appointment of a judge or a guardian ad litem occurred in the
Amchem settlement class action.  See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 600-06 (describing the
settlement negotiations process).
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Fourth, Flanagan involved a situation where Fibreboard faced
impending insolvency if the parties could not reach a settlement
agreement.181  The threat of inadequate funding which could fail to
satisfy future claims provided the impetus for plaintiffs to seek a
settlement agreement.182  No such threat preceded the settlement
negotiations in Amchem.183  Rather, Amchem concerned a multi-district
litigation suit involving a consortium of 20 defendants who desired to
finalize the seemingly never-ending flow of asbestos claims.184
Finally, the structure and terms of the Flanagan settlement class
action differ from that of the Amchem settlement.  The terms of the
Amchem settlement structure “reflect[ed] essential allocation
decisions designed to confine compensation and to limit defendants’
liability.”185  In contrast, the terms of the Flanagan settlement
structure “[did] not award damages to individual victims:  [rather] it
provide[d] [for a secure pool of] money and an equitable
distribution process to pay victims.”186
Despite these legal and factual distinctions between Amchem and
Flanagan, and whatever the outcome, Flanagan still must contend with
other issues raised by the settlement class action in the mass tort
context.187  In particular, Judge Smith’s criticism¾that constitutional
due process protections are violated by the Flanagan settlement class
action188¾exemplifies an overriding issue in Flanagan and this
Comment:  whether settlement class actions can and should be used
                                                 
181. See supra Part III.B (discussing the circumstances surrounding the Flanagan
settlement negotiations).
182. See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 976 (noting that plaintiffs settled because of a desire
to avoid the risks of insurance coverage litigation and to insure that funds remained
available to pay their claims).
183. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 601 (stating that settlement discussions “concentrated
on devising an administrative scheme for disposition of asbestos claims” not yet in
litigation).
184. See id. (noting that defendants made an offer “designed to settle all pending
and future asbestos cases”).
185. Id. at 627.
186. Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 976; see also Rice, supra note 26, at 5 (claiming that the
Flanagan settlement did not set awards among class members, and “merely provided
a classwide procedure to determine individual damages”).  Another distinguishing
feature of the Flanagan settlement is that it provides for a meaningful “back-end opt
out provision.”  See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 976 n.7.  Because this “back-end opt out
provision” allows a class member to go to trial after going through the administrative
proceedings, there are incentives for the parties involved to consider both individual
medical histories and comparative state tort laws.  See id.
187. These other issues involve adequate representation by class counsel, ethical
rules and professional obligations, and the authority of the court to approve of such
settlement class actions.  See Koniak, supra note 18, at 1049-50 (discussing these issues
in the context of the Georgine case).
188. See Flanagan II, 134 F.3d at 675 (Smith, J., dissenting) (asserting that the
Flanagan settlement class does not meet the requirements of due process because of
the “lack of common issues” and “inadequately-representative named plaintiffs”).
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as a legal response to pressing societal needs involving multiple
litigants or confined to a more limited use.  Implicit in this issue is
the following question:  If the judicial system gives full effect to due
process rights in the settlement class action context, i.e. adequate
representation and notice, can the settlement class action continue to
be used effectively as an alternative to litigation to secure
compensation for injured victims?
IV. ANALYSIS OF FLANAGAN V. AHEARN AND PERTINENT ISSUES
CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTION
This section addresses and dismisses two principal arguments189
against using the settlement class action as a solution to resolving
mass tort claims.  The prevalent and most controversial argument
against the settlement class action is that it infringes upon the due
                                                 
189. There are multiple arguments against using settlement class actions in the
mass tort context.  For example, many legal scholars and commentators assert that
Congress, and not the Supreme Court, should provide the resolution to the existing
mass tort crisis.  See Carrington & Apanovitch, supra note 12, at 474 (asserting that
the judicial system’s efforts to resolve mass tort litigation problems is constitutionally
unacceptable, citing Article III of the Constitution and the Rules Enabling Act as the
limiting factors); cf. Green, supra note 12, at 1801 (stating that even though it may be
better for the legislative branch to resolve the current issues of mass tort litigation,
the judicial system will have to continue to provide solutions, “within reasonable
bounds of competence and power,” until Congress chooses to act).
This issue, although not analyzed in this Comment, is of importance because it
signifies the magnitude of the controversy surrounding settlement class actions and
questions the judicial system’s power.  See Carrington & Apanovitch, supra note 12, at
476 (discussing the need to limit judicial authority because the separation of powers
between the three branches of government must be preserved).  Certification and
approval of settlement class actions entail broad exercise of judicial discretion to
determine the fairness and suitability of the settlement, which is dependent on the
specific circumstances of a case.  See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 28, at 1184-85
(detailing the numerous decisions judges must make in settlement class actions and
noting that these decisions “touch on important separation of powers issues”).  Thus,
the outcome of Flanagan can potentially affect the ability of courts to exercise judicial
discretion to resolve social and legal crisis in the mass tort arena through settlement
class actions.
In the face of legislative inaction, curtailing judicial activism in mass tort resolution
can potentially prove most detrimental to victims of mass torts.  See Green, supra note
12, at 1795 (arguing that depriving plaintiffs of the ability to conclude a settlement
on a classwide basis “could seriously harm class members by depriving them of the
best vehicle to obtain the largest net recovery”).  The Supreme Court should not
shun from addressing a much-needed solution to the growing number of mass tort
claims and should view the settlement class action as a viable and equitable
resolution when addressing Flanagan.  See Cabraser, supra note 48, at 392 (imploring
federal judges to provide solutions to the mass tort crisis through equitable tools,
such as class actions, and stating that “‘equity fears no difficulty’”) (quoting
Wheelock v. First Presbyterian Church, 51 P. 841, 844 (Cal. 1897)).  But see Shapiro,
supra note 88, at 951 n.107 (recognizing that external factors, such as divergent
political interests, may preclude legislative action in the mass tort arena, but claiming
that legislative inertia is not a reason to allow unauthorized judicial activism).
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process protections afforded to victims of mass tort injuries.190  The
due process protections in the settlement class action context under
Rule 23 consist primarily of two procedural prongs:  1) the need for
adequate representation, both by the plaintiffs’ counsel and the
plaintiffs’ class representatives,191 and  2) notice192 to all class members
bound by the settlement.  The due process prongs of adequate
representation and notice are discussed separately infra in Part IV.A
and Part IV.B, respectively.
In addition, objectors also argue that settlement class actions are
ripe for potential collusion between defendants’ and plaintiffs’
counsel.193  The underlying premise of this argument is that current
ethical rules and professional responsibilities prohibit lawyers from
actively engaging in settlement class actions versus traditional
individual litigation.194  The topic of collusion is discussed infra in Part
IV.C.
A. Due Process Prong One:  Adequate Representation
Adequate representation of future claimants is an important issue
in Flanagan because class actions that proceed as a “limited fund”
                                                 
190. See Flanagan II, 134 F.3d at 676 (Smith, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Flanagan settlement class action violates Congress’ mandate that no court can
promulgate rules or procedures that “abridge any substantive right”) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)); see also Carrington & Apanovitch, supra note 12, at 461
(arguing that the judicial system has exceeded its authority by permitting settlement
class actions in the mass tort context).  The arguments concerning plaintiffs’ due
process right are intertwined with issues involving the Rules Enabling Act, Article III
of the Constitution, and the Erie doctrine.  See generally Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t
Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858, 872-95 (1995)
(addressing arguments for and against judicial authority to resolve current problems
with mass tort litigation through settlement class actions and Rule 23).
191. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (mandating that “the representatives will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class”).
192. The issue of notice implicitly raises yet another objection to the use of
settlement class actions:  the right to opt out from the class.  This is vital in the
context of classes that are filed as a limited fund because under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) no
provision to opt out from the class exists.  Consequently, the issue of opt out is not
discussed in this Comment, except in the context of notice, which necessarily
precludes the exercise of the opt out provision.  See infra Part IV.B (focusing on the
notice requirement of Rule 23).
193. See Koniak, supra note 18, at 1051-86 (claiming that settlement class actions
designed to resolve mass tort exposure cases suffer from self-interested and greedy
lawyers).  See generally Coffee, supra note 8, at 1367-84 (discussing the inherent
problem of collusion in settlement class actions); Genine C. Swanzey, Using Class
Actions to Litigate Mass Torts:  Is There Justice for the Individual?, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
421-22 (1998) (addressing the special ethical problems class actions raise when
dealing with mass tort litigation such as “conflicts of interest, astronomical attorneys’
fees,” and lack of communication between class members and their attorneys).
194. See Swanzey, supra note 193, at 429 (claiming that “collective justice is at odds
with the traditional lawyer-client relationship” because it creates impermissible
conflicts of interests between the attorney and the client).
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under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) preclude consent and bind all knowing and
unknowing plaintiffs.195  As discussed supra Part III.B, depending on
the outcome of insurance litigation with Continental and Pacific,196
Fibreboard faced impending insolvency.  This threat of inadequate
funding for pending and future claims allowed the settlement class
action to be filed as a “limited fund.”197  Consequently, Flanagan
eluded that which the Supreme Court stated was necessary for a
settlement class action filed under Rule 23(b)(3), a predominance of
an underlying issue over individual claims.198  Nevertheless, Flanagan
still must contend with Rule 23(a)’s requirement of adequate
representation.199
The argument concerning inadequate representation in Flanagan
is two-fold.  In Flanagan, plaintiffs’ counsel simultaneously
represented both present claimants and future claimants, giving rise
to the first assertion of inadequate representation.200  The general
objection to simultaneous representation is that plaintiffs’ counsel
may be tempted to negotiate settlement terms that compromise
future claimants’ interests for the benefit of present claimants.201
                                                 
195. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) and advisory committee notes.
196. See supra Part III.B (detailing the circumstances leading to the Flanagan
settlement).
197. See supra Part III.B (explaining the “limited fund” concept).
198. The Flanagan settlement class action still needed to meet both the
commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a).  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
The class members’ interests in obtaining reasonable assurance of available funds,
however, must be sufficient to meet the requirements of commonality and typicality
under Rule 23(a).  See supra note 174 and accompanying text (describing the
common interests between the present and future claimants); see also Rice & Davis,
supra note 2, at 140-45 (asserting that the future claimant class “shared a real and
enormous risk concerning the insurance coverage dispute” and that the Fifth Circuit
and district court complied with Amchem by focusing upon whether Rule 23(a)’s
commonality requirement was present without taking into consideration settlement).
199. Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Amchem did not address the issue of
whether plaintiffs’ counsel adequately represented the plaintiff class.  See Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 n.20 (1997) (concluding that because
common questions of law or fact did not predominate in this case and that the
named plaintiffs did not adequately represent the interests of the whole class, there
was no need to address the adequacy of counsel issue).  The Supreme Court found
that the class representatives did not represent the class interests adequately, as
required under Rule 23(a).  See id. at 624-26.  Consequently, this finding precluded
any inquiry as to the issue of “adequacy-of-counsel.”  See id. at 626 n.20 (stating that
the Court “discretely” declined to address “adequacy-of-counsel” issues).  In Flanagan,
however, the objection to adequate representation concerned only plaintiffs’ counsel
and not the named representatives of the plaintiff class.  See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 976
n.10 (noting that there was no challenge to the adequacy of representation of class
representatives and declining to consider the issue).
200. See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 978-80 (discussing the alleged conflict of interest
and finding that none existed).
201. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 28, at 1198 (explaining that collusion
arguments allege that a “sell out” of class members’ interests has occurred for the
benefit of other parties, such as the attorneys or present claimants); see also Cabraser,
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Objectors to Flanagan also argued that an “intraclass” conflict existed
within the future claimants class itself.202  The alleged conflict
involved the “near futures,” who desired a settlement providing for
uncapped damages, and the “far futures,” who wanted limitations
placed on individual damage awards.203  The “near futures” preferred
uncapped damages because the likelihood of Fibreboard’s insolvency
appeared to be low at the time they would hope to collect their
damages.204  Conversely, the “far futures” feared that by the time they
were eligible to receive damages, Fibreboard’s resources would
already have been depleted by the damage awards paid out to the
“near futures.”205
The Fifth Circuit, after evaluating extensive testimony of expert
witnesses, determined that plaintiffs’ counsel represented both
present and future claimant classes vigorously.206  Moreover, the Fifth
Circuit found that because Fibreboard’s insurance litigation outcome
was uncertain it could not provide any assurance that funds would be
available for any claimant.207  Specifically, if Fibreboard lost its
insurance litigation, it would likely fight all claims made against them
aggressively.208  This fight inevitably would result in lengthy and costly
litigation, causing delayed recovery of compensation, if any, and
increased attorney fees.209  Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that no
“intraclass” conflict between “near futures” and “far futures”
existed.210
The Supreme Court in Amchem concluded that simultaneous
representation of present and future claimants, as well as the
                                                 
supra note 48, at 385 (noting that perhaps the real downfall of the Amchem settlement
class action was the perception that “class members’ rights were traded away for the
inventory plaintiffs’ benefit”).
202. See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 980-82 (discussing the alleged conflict between class
members who currently had an asbestos-related illness and those whose illness was
not expected to become apparent for many years).
203. See id. at 981 (discussing the argument that the “near futures” wanted no
limits placed on damages and the “far futures” preferred limits to “conserve funds”
so that resources would be available for them in the future).
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 980 (noting that the record supports the district court’s finding that
the class was “adequately represented”).
207. See id. at 981 (citing the lower court’s finding of the importance of avoiding
“catastrophic results” which would result if Fibreboard lost its appeal in the coverage
case).
208. See id. (speculating that Fibreboard “would live up to its pledge to actively
defend any claims and delay any recovery”).
209. See id. (enumerating the problems claimants would face if Fibreboard actively
defended against the claims at issue, such as delayed recovery and risk of attrition of
available funds due to larger legal fees).
210. See id. at 982 (affirming the lower court’s finding of fact “that common
interests within the class overwhelmed minimal conflicts”).
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combination of a “sprawling” class, precluded a finding of adequate
representation.211  Although counsel simultaneously represented both
present claimants and future claimants in Flanagan as well, the
Supreme Court should not de-certify the settlement class on this
basis.212  Precautions taken by the Fifth Circuit ensured adequate
representation for both present and future claimants throughout the
Flanagan settlement negotiations.213  In addition to the factual
distinction from Amchem,214 the Flanagan settlement class action also
presented the best solution to all claimants’ need for
compensation.215
Several factors suggest that, despite simultaneous representation of
both the present and future claimant classes, plaintiffs’ counsel
represented the interests of all class members adequately.  First, the
settlement negotiations in Flanagan began because of the potential
risk that Fibreboard would lose its insurance coverage case with
Continental.216  Loss of this insurance coverage would leave both
present and future claimants with inadequate funding for their
claims.217  Present claimants would face drawn-out and expensive
litigation and future claimants would face a depleted fund.218  Thus,
the settlement itself was a response to the overall need by the class
members to secure sufficient compensation for their injuries and
prevent delayed recovery.219  In this context, the settlement class
action presented a viable alternative to costly litigation.  By focusing
on the overall need of the class the Fifth Circuit realized that
                                                 
211. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623-26 (1997)
(maintaining that “no settlement class called to our attention is as sprawling as this
one” and concluding that the requirement of adequacy of representation was not
satisfied).
212. See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 980 (agreeing with the district court which found
that “at no time, did a material limitation on the representation of the class . . . exist
due to concurrent representation of present and future claimants”).
213. See discussion infra notes 217-28 and accompanying text (discussing the
actions taken by the court to ensure fair representation for both present and future
claimants, including the appointment of a judge and a guardian ad litem to protect
the interests at stake in the settlement process).
214. See supra Part III.C (comparing the Flanagan and Amchem settlements).
215. See Rice, supra note 26, at 5 (arguing that the Flanagan settlement agreement
was fair to both the present and future claimants and asserting that absent a
settlement, both groups of claimants faced the real possibility of recovering
nothing).
216. See supra Part III.
217. See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 993 (declaring that the settlement was driven by the
insurance litigation which would have been “catastrophic for whomever was on the
losing side”).
218. See id.
219. See id. (asserting that under the settlement, the entire class benefits from the
greater likelihood that funds will be available and distributed under a less
complicated system).
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individual interests needed to be suppressed220 so that maximum gain
could be attained.  This perspective reflects an equitable approach
that allows “individuals . . . to enjoy their full measure of rights in an
absolute, timely, and cost-effective fashion without impairing the
similar rights and interests of others.”221
Second, when Judge Parker appointed Judge Higgenbotham to
oversee and facilitate the settlement negotiations,222 his presence
prevented the settlement negotiations from becoming an avenue for
the attorneys’ self-interests.223  Judge Higgenbotham, as an objective
party, also presented what is often lacking in individual litigation:  a
clear and continuous focus of the objectives, as well as a desire to use
the most “just, speedy, and inexpensive”224 route necessary to meet
such objectives.  Consequently, Judge Higgenbotham’s presence also
integrated the spirit of the FRCP.
Third, to supplement protection of the future claimants’ interests,
the court appointed a law professor as guardian ad litem for the
future claimant class.225  The professor’s sole responsibility was to
guard and protect the interests of the futures class members by
reviewing the terms of the settlement agreement.226  Therefore, the
likelihood that plaintiffs’ counsel negotiated the present claimants’
interests to the detriment of future claimants’ interests is minimal.227
                                                 
220. See Cabraser, supra note 48, at 381-82 (commenting that although some
compromise of a party’s interests and a lack of individual control are often necessary
in a class action context, this is typical in all types of litigation because there are
always factors that contribute to the outcome of litigation that are beyond individual
control).
221. Id. at 382 (noting that in the mass tort context, an equitable intercession is
preferred).
222. See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 978.  The appointment of Judge Higgenbotham
occurred after Continental approached the settlement negotiations in March 1993.
See id.  Thus, Judge Higgenbotham was present throughout the core settlement
negotiations process, which spanned from March 1993 until September 1993.  See id.
at 970-72 (outlining the settlement negotiation process).
223. See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 982 (stating that “negotiations  . . . were often
conducted under the auspices of Judge Higgenbotham”).  Cf. Cabraser, supra note
48, at 378 (commenting that the Amchem decision frowns upon the use of Rule 23
and the settlement class action as a means for “instant gratification of self-interest” by
attorneys seeking high contingency fees).
224. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (articulating the scope and purpose of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure).
225. See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 972 (stating that the court appointed Professor Eric
D. Green of the Boston University School of Law to serve as guardian ad litem for the
class).
226. See id. (“Professor Green was directed to render a report to the court
analyzing the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the settlement from the point
of view of the members of the provisionally certified Global Health Claimant Class.”).
227. See id. at 979 (recounting the testimony of Professor Geoffrey Hazard, an
experienced consultant in asbestos cases, who testified that during the April 1993 to
August 9, 1993 negotiation period, plaintiffs’ counsel negotiated primarily for
present claims to be settled and that because Continental offered potentially
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Thus, the Fifth Circuit properly addressed the issue of adequate
representation.  The Fifth Circuit appointed an objective
representative, Judge Higgenbotham, who protected the class
members’ overall interests.228  In addition, appointment of the
guardian ad litem for the future claimant class ensured avocation of
their interests.229  Therefore, the Fifth Circuit heeded the Court’s
warning in Amchem that adequate representation be provided “either
in the terms of the settlement or in the structure of the
negotiations.”230
Nevertheless, the argument that Flanagan’s circumstances
mandated separate counsel representation for the future claimants
and present claimants still exists.231  Further division of the future
claimants class into sub-classes, each with its own representative and
counsel, to ensure adequate and fair representation as required by
Rule 23(a), may also be necessary.232  If, however, the Supreme Court
concludes that the Flanagan future claimants class required sub-
classes, then the Court should:  (1) clearly delineate the requirement
of sub-classes for all settlement class actions, regardless of its
classification under Rule 23,233 (2) provide a detailed structure that
will assist courts in deciding how many sub-classes are necessary and
under what circumstances they are needed, and (3) remand the
Flanagan case so that this new requirement can be met.
This approach still glosses over the realities of mass tort litigation
and of the Flanagan case in particular.234  A peculiar aspect of the class
action, and the settlement class action, is that it can offer greater
                                                 
unlimited funds if Fibreboard won, future claimants were not competing for the
same fund as the present claimants).
228. See id. at 978.
229. See id.
230. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627 (1997).
231. See Ashman, supra note 100, at 1 (suggesting that a class of future claimants
should be further divided into sub-classes to obtain court’s approval of the settlement
class action after Amchem).
232. See Aldock & Wyner, supra note 4, at 905 (postulating that a “prudent
reading” of the Supreme Court’s decision in Amchem yields the potential requirement
of sub-classes for all future global classes that contain both present and future
claimants).  But see Cohen, supra note 2, at 315-16 (positing that if a large number of
sub-classes are required to obtain certification for the class, “the efficiencies of the
class [action] device [may be] lost”).
233. See Aldock & Wyner, supra note 4, at 905 (noting that with regards to the
adequate representation requirement, the Court’s decision in Amchem gave minimal
guidance and its rationale lacked “articulat[ion]” of any meaningful standards).
234. See id. at 905 (noting that current mass tort litigation is plagued by:  repeated
and prolonged delays; high transaction costs; inconsistent and unsubstantiated
verdicts; and the threat of defendant’s future bankruptcy or insolvency leading to no
assurances for future victims of the tort) (citing Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc.,
157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994)).
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protection to the class members than individual litigation.235  This
observation exposes the subtle irony of the arguments often made by
opponents to the settlement class action regarding inadequate
representation.236  Specifically, if a claim is litigated individually, no
prerequisites or rules exist to ensure that a certain level of adequate
representation is met.237  The plaintiff’s attorney can easily negotiate a
settlement with the defendant’s attorney that is detrimental to the
interests of the plaintiff.238  Other than vague professional and ethical
guideposts, no representative or judge is actively looking out for the
plaintiff’s best interest.239  Thus, the settlement class action not only
provides a viable alternative to litigation, but it also sets forth
standards to ensure that proposed agreements are “fair, adequate
and reasonable.”240
B. Due Process Prong Two:  Notice
This section addresses the second prong of due process:  notice.  If
the Supreme Court finds that the Flanagan settlement class action
meets the procedural requirements of Rule 23(a), which requires
adequate representation, and of Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the “limited fund”
category, then it may be forced to address an issue241 it avoided in
                                                 
235. See Cabraser, supra note 48, at 385 (arguing that class actions actually afford
individual litigants greater protection and better representation because of the
stringent requirements that the class action suit demands:  notice of all the events
occurring during litigation must be given to all class members; class representatives,
who are not attorneys, “who act as watchdogs of their interests”; extensive judicial
approval and evaluation as mandated by the procedures of a class action; regulated
attorney fees; and the ability for class members to voice their concerns directly to the
judge overseeing the proceedings); see also Mullenix, supra note 12, at 638
(evaluating the advisory committee’s proposal of Rule 23(b)(4) to expressly provide
a provision permitting settlement class actions and questioning opponents’ efforts to
defeat such proposal because it would deny plaintiffs of mass tort injuries “one of the
few means for resolving these massive disputes” and “forego, on behalf of these
citizens, an array of judicially required protections that simply are not available in
other forms of litigation”).
236. See Cabraser, supra note 48, at 385 (questioning “who checks for adequacy of
representation or conflict” when a claim is settled outside of the class action
context).
237. See Aldock & Wyner, supra note 4, at 905 (commenting that most mass tort
claims brought by individuals settle and asserting that “[t]hroughout [this
individualized] settlement process, there is a lack of the important structural
protections for class members that [FRCP] Rule 23 guarantees in connection with
settlement class actions”).
238. See Mullenix, supra note 12, at 637 (arguing that in individual litigation,
nothing prevents attorneys from “sell[ing] their clients down the river”).
239. See id. at 638 (noting that many aspects of individual litigation can not come
under judicial review).
240. See id. at 637-38 (listing all the judicial protections afforded to class action
members to safeguard their interests that are often not provided in other forms of
litigation).
241. The Supreme Court noted in Amchem that “[i]f certification issues were
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Amchem:242  whether notice is required in a “limited fund” action filed
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).  Indeed, the Supreme Court’s cogent
recognition in Amchem that notice is a serious issue in the settlement
context further supports the proposition that it may be a central issue
in Flanagan.243  If the Supreme Court addresses the notice issue, the
Flanagan decision will overshadow Amchem because it will spell the
future legitimacy of the settlement class action and potentially limit
the judicial role in approving use of such device.244
The Supreme Court stated that unlike Rule 23(b)(3), Rules
23(b)(1) & (2) are aptly suited for “class action treatment.”245  Under
Rules 23(b)(1) & (2), however, no provision explicitly grants the
opportunity to opt out,246 which makes any notice to a class member
unnecessary.  This res judicata effect thereby implicitly raises the
following issue:  whether in the context of mass tort litigation
                                                 
genuinely in doubt . . . the jurisdictional issues would loom larger” and therefore,
insinuated that if a settlement class did meet certification requirements, then issues
concerning notice and lack of actual case or controversy would be ripe for
consideration.  See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 n.15 (1997).
242. The Supreme Court concluded that it did not have to address notice because
it found that the settlement class could not be certified under the requirements of
Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3).  See id. at 628-29.
243. See id. (stating that although issue of notice did not have to be contended
with in the present case, they recognized “the gravity of the question whether class
action notice sufficient under the Constitution and Rule 23 could ever be given to
legions so unselfconscious and amorphous”); see also Rice & Davis, supra note 2, at 10
(noting that whether notice will be required for future claimant classes is a subject
matter that was not addressed in Amchem).
244. Currently, only class actions that proceed under Rule 23(b)(3) require both
notice and the opportunity to opt out.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (describing the
requirements imposed on Rule 23(b)(3) class action suits).  Alternative categories of
Rule 23, on the other hand, do not have to provide class members notice or an
opportunity to opt out.  See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 n.3
(1985) (restricting its holding that notice is required to “those class actions which
seek to bind known plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or predominantly for money
judgements”).
The Supreme Court has not addressed the notice issue in the class action context
since its decision in Shutts.  See Steven T. O. Cottreau, The Due Process Right to Opt Out
of Class Actions, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 480, 480 (1998).  In particular, the Supreme Court
recently dismissed two cases, Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83 (1997) (per curiam),
and Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117 (1994) (per curiam), that would
have forced it to decide when the right to notice and the right to opt out from a class
must be given to class members.  See Cottreau, supra, at 480 n.3 (dismissing because
issue not properly presented to the court); Ticor (dismissing because issue was not
ripe for consideration)).  Therefore, Flanagan represents the unique opportunity for
the Supreme Court to clarify whether notice and opt out requirements are imposed
on all of the Rule 23 class action categories, or just class actions that proceed under
Rule 23(b)(3).
245. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615.
246. See Cottreau, supra note 244, at 480 n.2 (defining the right to opt out as “the
right to return a form and be excluded from both the benefits and the binding effect
of the class litigation” and noting that class actions which do not grant the right to
opt out are considered “mandatory”).
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requiring predominantly monetary damages, notice should be
required, regardless of the classification of the settlement class
action.247
The question then becomes:  how does one accomplish notice to
those who have yet to discover their injuries?  The logical conclusion
is that any form of notice to an “unknowing” victim of a mass tort is
inherently futile because such victim has yet to discover their injury
and realize the significance of the notice.248  In addition, with respect
to “knowing” future claimants, the opportunity to opt out does not
increase the protection already afforded to them by requiring
adequate representation throughout settlement negotiations.249
                                                 
247. The Fifth Circuit classified the settlement class action under Rule
23(b)(1)(B), which does not require that notice be given to members of the class. See
Flanagan I, 90 F.3d 963, 984 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that the explicit language of
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) supports the classification).  See id. at 984 (noting that the explicit
language of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) supports the classification); see also Shutts, 472 U.S. at
811 n.3 (excusing notice for class actions filed under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)).  In doing
so, the Fifth Circuit claimed that Rule 23(b)(1)(B) has always been an equitable
provision that traces back to English common law and the bill of peace:
The traditional limited-fund class action is an equitable and unitary
disposition of a fund too small to satisfy all claims. . . .  Unitary adjudication
of a limited fund is crucial because allowing plaintiffs to sue individually
would make the litigation “an unseemly race to the courtroom door with
monetary prizes for a few winners and worthless judgements for the rest.” . . .
Thus, [limited fund actions] sound in equity even though the relief they
provide necessarily affects the amount of money damages that claimants can
ultimately receive.
Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 986 (citations omitted).
The Fifth Circuit constructed its rationale concerning opt out and notice around
the interpretation of Shutts, which confined its holding regarding personal
jurisdiction and notice to certain class actions filed.  See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811 n.3; see
also supra note 244 and accompanying text.  The Court in Shutts stated:  “[w]e
intimate no view concerning other types of class actions, such as those seeking
equitable relief.”  Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811.  Thus, the Court declined to answer the
dispositive issue of whether notice is required in mandatory class actions that involve
claimants seeking largely monetary damages.
As more lawyers and courts try to contend with the expounding issues and
problems raised by mass tort litigation, use of mandatory non-opt out settlement class
actions to resolve litigation involving predominantly monetary damages may be a
popular alternative after Amchem.  See Coffee, supra note 125, at B4 (noting that the
different standards between Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and Rule 23(b)(3) class actions
provide strong incentives for future settlement class actions to proceed under the
“mandatory” class action categories and avoid Amchem).  Consequently, the pressure
on the Supreme Court to resolve this complicated issue is rising.  See Linda S.
Mullenix, Getting to Shutts, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 727, 741 (1998) (reviewing the Court’s
decision in Shutts and subsequent circumvention of the notice issue and commenting
that “[o]ddly, the Shutts problem has now been transformed into an entirely
different problem of simply getting to Shutts”).
248. See Cramton, supra note 5, at 835 (noting that those who have yet to suffer a
cognizable injury will not appreciate notice of a class action suit, regardless of which
method of notice is used).
249. See Green, supra note 12, at 1797-98 (arguing that other means exist, such as
fairness hearings and appointment of a guardian ad litem, to ensure the interests of
class members are protected).  But see Cottreau, supra note 244, at 518 n.152
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Consequently, requiring notice in a “limited fund” action serves no
legitimate purpose.
Moreover, the objective of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class is to ensure its
binding effect on all future claimants.  Permitting future claimants
the option to opt out of a settlement class action creates the precise
problem the “limited fund” is designed to avoid¾a race to the
courthouse to compete for monetary and punitive damages that
could drive a corporation into insolvency, thereby leaving other
future claimants with no recourse.250  Thus, although the Supreme
Court should clarify notice requirements for settlement class actions
filed under Rule 23(b)(3), it should not impose notice requirements
upon the equitable categories of Rule 23.
The argument that without imposition of a notice requirement,
Flanagan-like settlement class actions will become a widespread reality
is likewise unfounded.251  Few defendants can argue impending
insolvency legitimately, which would be a necessary prerequisite to
certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) as “limited fund.”252  Flanagan
                                                 
(asserting that the right to opt out, and hence the right to notice, provides protective
measures against “erroneous deprivation”); cf. id. at 500 n.85 (citing Diane P. Wood,
Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597, 602-05 (1986-1987), noting
that in situations where it is not feasible to adjudicate a representative’s claim
without also adjudicating all other claimants’ claims, the adequate representation
requirement is sufficient to guarantee due process).
250. See Cabraser, supra note 48, at 382 (insinuating that equity demands that the
judicial system prevent the abhorrent effects of seemingly endless mass tort litigation
that ultimately results in future claimants foregoing compensation for their injuries
and dooming corporations to exile because of impending insolvency); see also Cohen,
supra note 2, at 302 (stipulating that the precise reason for seeking certification
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) as a limited fund is to control the conflict between present
claimants desiring “larger and earlier shares of available money” and future
claimants wanting to preserve limited funds).  But see Cottreau, supra note 244, at 481
(claiming that “[t]he unfairness of many mandatory class actions demands a robust
right to opt out”); cf. Swanzey, supra note 193, at 424, 434 (acknowledging the
conflict between present and future claimants for monetary damages from a limited
fund, but concluding that Rule 23 is an inappropriate mechanism to resolve such
conflicts because it trades personal justice for judicial economy).
251. See Rice, supra note 26, at 5 (noting petitioner’s arguments that Flanagan “will
become a road map for future settlement class actions,” but acknowledging that the
“unique, factual setting” of Flanagan undermines that fear).  But see Flanagan I,
90 F.3d 963, 994 (5th Cir. 1996) (Smith, J., dissenting) (claiming that the outcome of
Flanagan carries significant weight and will allegedly provide the impetus for other
financially troubled companies to file similarly-structured global settlements to avoid
bankruptcy and resolve all future claims); cf. Richard B. Schmitt, The Deal Makers:
Some Firms Embrace the Widely Dreaded Class-Action Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1996, at
A1 (discussing how companies are using class action suits as a tool for settling all
future claims and thus eliminating the time and expense of individual suits).
252. See Rice, supra note 26, at 5 (claiming Flanagan will not have a large impact in
the settlement class action area of law); see also Coffee, supra note 125, at B4
(recognizing that after Amchem future defendants will try to argue insolvency in order
to be classified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), but noting the difficulties of making a
credible argument).
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presented a unique factual setting that potentially precluded
compensation for victims if Fibreboard did not secure insurance
coverage for the claims.253  For Flanagan to become a “role-model,”
future defendants would need to replicate the threatening insurance
litigation, as well as the poor financial condition that Fibreboard
found itself facing.254  Rather, the constitution of a “limited fund”
itself will be a crucial issue liable to generate much debate and
controversy.255  Therefore, even though notice and the opportunity to
opt out may be necessary for settlement class actions filed under Rule
23(b)(3), the Supreme Court should not extend the notice
requirement to other provisions of Rule 23.
C. Legal Ethics, Professional Responsibilities, and Collusion
Outside of due process concerns relating to adequate
representation and notice, settlement class actions also raise
perplexing issues relating to legal ethics and the professional
responsibilities of a lawyer.256  The class action device first gained
popularity among the plaintiffs’ bar as a way of pressuring defendants
to approach the settlement table.257  Recently, however, the
defendants’ bar has attempted to use the class action device to
facilitate settlement in a variety of cases spanning the spectrum from
product liability to mass torts.258
                                                 
253. See supra Part III.
254. See supra notes 249, 250 and accompanying text.
255. See Cohen, supra note 2, at 316 (predicting that there will be future battles
over what comprises a limited fund, asserting that “no defendant has truly
‘unlimited’ funds to resolve any litigation”).
256. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 28, at 1188 (noting that class action suits
give rise to conflict of interest problems because of the large number of plaintiffs
represented by one lawyer); Sofia Adrogue, Mass Tort Class Actions in the New
Millennium, 17 REV. LITIG. 427, 451 (1998) (listing the ethical issues that may be
triggered by class action suits); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort
Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 481 (1994) (discussing how the attorney/client
bond is non-existent in mass tort litigation).
257. See Ross F. Bass, Jr. & John W. Robinson, III, The Metamorphosis of Mass Tort
Class Actions:  A Fifth Circuit Perspective, 17 MISS. C. L. REV. 207, 207-08 (1997)
(comparing the initial use of the class action device as solely the plaintiffs’ device to
pressure defendants to settle the class to the present use of the class action device by
defendants to achieve global resolution and finality to all outstanding claims or suits
filed against them).
258. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.) (anti-
hemophiliac blood products), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995); In re Northern District
of Calif. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982)
(contraception medical device), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); Walker v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 226 (S.D. W. Va. 1997) (smoking-related health claims);
Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995) (nicotine levels in
cigarettes), rev’d, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); In re General Motors Corp. Pickup
Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 846 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (defective fuel
tanks), vacated and remanded, 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 824 (1995).
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This recent, innovative use of settlement class actions by the
defendants’ bar has met with intense criticism.259  Critics accuse
defendants’ counsel of using settlement class actions to seek umbrella
protection from expansive lawsuits involving mass tort claims.260
These same critics also accuse plaintiffs’ counsel of using settlement
class actions to generate healthy attorney fees and dispense with time-
consuming claims.261  Finally, objectors to settlement class actions
argue that simultaneous representation of both present and future
claimants creates a conflict of interest that prevents lawyers from
adhering to the professional responsibilities owed to their clients.262
A factor that leads to such accusations is the collusive263 appearance
of settlement proposals.  For example, in Flanagan the defendants’
counsel approached plaintiffs’ counsel with a global settlement
proposal to resolve both inventory and future claims.264  The
attempted settlement negotiations were tedious.  Progress moved
slowly from April 1993 until July 1993.265  Finally, in August 1993, both
parties reached an agreement and in September 1993, the settlement
class action commenced.266  Despite the skill and expertise of
plaintiffs’ class counsel and the intensive negotiations that spanned
more than five months, objectors complained that the global
settlement was a non-adversarial sell-out of the future claimants.267
                                                 
259. See Bass & Robinson, supra note 257, at 213-14 (discussing criticisms of
settlement class actions).
260. See Lamberth, supra note 18, at 150 (claiming that defendant corporations
use settlement class actions to limit their liability and eliminate the nuisance of
ongoing litigation).
261. See id. at 157-58 (asserting that plaintiffs’ counsel abuses settlement class
actions to settle inventory claims and increase their fees).
262. Thus, the arguments involving simultaneous representation and adequate
representation are also pertinent in the discussion of legal ethics and professional
responsibilities.  See supra Part IV.C.
263. Collusion is defined as:
[a]n agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his
rights by the forms of law, or to obtain an object forbidden by law.  It implies
the existence of fraud of some kind, the employment of fraudulent means, or of lawful
means for the accomplishment of an unlawful purpose.  A secret combination,
conspiracy or concert action between two or more persons for fraudulent or
deceitful purpose.
Adrogue, supra note 256, at 456 (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 157
F.R.D. 246, 331 (E.D. Pa. 1994)).
264. See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d 963, 969 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that Fibreboard first
approached plaintiffs’ counsel to discuss a possible global settlement in 1990 and
1991, which ultimately proved unfruitful).
265. See id. at 970-71.
266. See id. at 972.
267. See id. at 994 (Smith, J., dissenting) (accusing the global settlement reached
between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ counsel as a means to achieve “profit at the
expense of absent class members” and “an affront to the integrity of the judicial
system”).  At least one commentator disagrees, however, arguing that no basis exists
for claims of collusion where plaintiffs’ class counsel are
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Many of the objections to the Flanagan settlement class action reflect
the arguments sketched above concerning legal ethics and
professional responsibilities.268
The critics overlook that the settlement class action relieves
defendants of the continual threat of repetitive and costly litigation.269
Thus, the class action, although certified for settlement purposes
rather than for litigation, continues to provide meaningful leverage
to the plaintiff class.270  In addition, factors such as the fairness
hearing,271 the appointment of a guardian ad litem,272 and objectors
themselves273 further preserve the adversarial nature of the settlement
negotiations.274  Finally, plaintiffs’ counsel, although approached by
                                                 
likely to be the most experienced, knowledgeable, and passionate advocates
for the class[,] . . . tend[ing] to be the lawyers who . . . “made” the class by
taking on the individual cases early when they were immature, investing their
time and effort in risky matters, and developing the evidence and law that
enables the class to be mature enough to be in a position to settle the action.
Green, supra note 12, at 1795.
268. See supra note 256 (outlining the ethical arguments proffered by critics of
class action suits).
269. See Green, supra note 12, at 1794 (arguing that settlement class actions
provide powerful leverage to the plaintiff class because they relieve defendants of
“multiple repetitive individual actions over many years”).
Professor Coffee argues that plaintiffs’ counsel cannot effectively use the threat of
a class action trial as leverage during settlement negotiations because the class is
“provisionally certified ‘for settlement only’” but not for actual litigation.  See John C.
Coffee, Jr., Summary, The Corruption of the Class Action:  The New Technology of Collusion,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 854 (1995).  This argument is no longer valid after Amchem,
where the Supreme Court stated that full effect must be given to all the requirements
laid out by Rule 23(a) and 23(b) even when a class is seeking certification for
purposes of settlement.  See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621
(1997).  Thus, the possibility that plaintiffs’ counsel can litigate the class action suit is
still viable because all the requisite requirements of Rule 23 have been met.  See
Coffee, supra, at 857.
270. See Green, supra note 12, at 1794-95 (asserting that settlement class actions’
value as a leverage mechanism for the plaintiffs class does not rely exclusively on
whether it is “triable”).
271. Under Rule 23(e), judges assess the fairness of the settlement to the parties
involved.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (requiring court approval for dismissal or
compromise).  Rule 23(e) does not delineate clear standards, however, leaving the
judges to depend upon jurisprudence that disfavors bargaining.  See Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 28, at 1168-69 (discussing courts’ reliance on jurisprudence and ethics
codes).
272. See Green, supra note 12, at 1796-97 (discussing factors that lessen the
possibility of collusion between defendants and plaintiffs’ counsel).
273. See id.
274. It is important to note that negotiations between plaintiffs’ and defendants’
counsel typically occur before the settlement class action is filed.  Therefore, these
factors do not address the possibility that defendants have “picked” plaintiffs’
counsel.  Rather, they help to ensure the terms and structure of the negotiated
settlement are fair to all class members.  See Coffee, supra note 269, at 853 (discussing
effects of defendants choosing plaintiffs’ attorneys).
Another issue that runs alongside ethical concerns is that settlement class actions
may violate Article III’s requirement of an actual case or controversy.  See U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2 (extending judicial authority over cases and controversies).  For the
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defendants’ counsel to negotiate a settlement, must still contend with
other attorneys seeking resolution of clients’ claims.  The free-market
competition among the plaintiffs’ bar to represent a global class of
mass tort claimants also works to lower what would otherwise be
higher attorney fees.275
The controversy surrounding legal ethics and their juxtaposition
with settlement class actions is substantially a result of the individual-
oriented view of the judicial system.  Current legal institutions and
ethical rules submit that individuals have the right to a jury trial,
vigorous representation by their lawyers, and meaningful control over
litigation of their claims.276  This individualistic premise of litigation,277
however, neglects to consider the evolution of the class action as a
legal response to changing cultural and judicial needs involving
multiple litigants, especially in the mass tort context.278  The current
ethical and professional requirements that mandate or favor client
autonomy in settlement class actions279 have the potential adverse
                                                 
argument concerning lack of an actual case or controversy under Article III, see
Mullenix, supra note 12, at 635, 636 n.96, quoting Professor Eric D. Green, guardian
ad litem for the future claimant class in Flanagan, who states poignantly:
The second objection by the law teachers opposing the proposed [Rule
23(b)(4)] amendment[, which would expressly permit settlement class
actions] is based on Article III “case or controversy” concerns when a class
action is simultaneously certified and settled.  This is, of course, a potentially
serious issue in the abstract . . . . However, in all the cases in which I have
been involved, there is no way in which any moderately objective observer
could doubt the existence of a concrete dispute with all the requisite
adverseness.  Settlement does not eliminate the existence of a dispute
between the parties.  All it means is that they have tentatively worked out a
way to resolve the dispute short of a fully adjudicated judgment, appeal and
post-judgment skirmishes.  To argue that the existence of a class action
settlement destroys Article III jurisdiction overproves the contention to a
point of dangerous absurdity that would have profound negative
consequences far beyond the class action context.
Id. at 636 n.96.
275. See Edley & Weiler, supra note 1, at 406 (discussing how plaintiffs’ class
counsel is deterred from generating fees that are too high even if they are “freely-
negotiated” because “members of the private bar [may be] prepared to bid with
smaller percentage rates for the right to represent asbestos victims”).
276. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 28, at 1220 (suggesting that current
paradigms guaranteeing a jury trial or solid communication with a lawyer no longer
work and that innovative means are necessary to enable adequate process and
compensation for people harmed in mass torts).
277. See YEAZELL, supra note 10, at 14 (arguing that group litigation must be
approached as a caveat to the traditional “individualistic ethos” that pervades
society).
278. See Cabraser, supra note 48, at 380 (asserting that it is well known that “[i]n a
mass tort context, individuals have, as a matter of economic and institutional reality,
little control over individual destinies”).
279. Moreover, client autonomy is protected adequately by the due process
protection afforded by Rule 23(a), which requires adequate representation.  See
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 28, at 1192 (stating that the judicial system has
approached the ethical issues involved in a settlement class action by focusing upon
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effect of harming the very persons they aim to protect.280
For example, a mass tort normally involves a large number of
victims.281  This mass infliction of harm causes at least thousands of
identical claims to flood the judicial system.282  A vast majority of these
claims will settle because of delayed judicial response and high costs,
not to mention the difficult causation and medical issues involved
with litigating a mass tort claim.283  Settlement of the claim itself,
however, is wholly dependent on whether the defendant is still
solvent and able to compensate the injured victim.284  In effect,
individual litigation in the mass tort context operates as a lottery.285
As the class action evolved to meet the needs of mass tort victims in
the form of settlement class actions, so must the ethical rules and
professional responsibilities that govern lawyers.286
To respond adequately to ethical problems raised by settlement
class actions in the mass tort context, the Supreme Court must look
beyond traditional ethical and professional responsibilities placed on
lawyers in the arena of individual litigation.287  For example, the
Model Code288 and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct289
                                                 
adequate representation, thereby evading issues like client consent).
280. See Green, supra note 12, at 1795 (arguing that denouncing the use of
settlement class actions on the basis of ethical concerns will hurt mass tort victims the
most because it will “depriv[e] them of the best vehicle to obtain the largest net
recovery”).
281. See Cabraser, supra note 48, at 381 (discussing the legal system’s limitations
when dealing with victims of mass torts).
282. See id. (contrasting mass tort actions with those arising from “one-on-one”
incidents).
283. See id. (stating that “[t]he individual trial of every tort claim in the mass tort
context is not only statistically unlikely, but also logistically impossible” due to a
number of interrelated factors).
284. See id. (discussing actions in which asbestos manufacturers filed for
bankruptcy).
285. See id. (describing the judicial system as a lottery where the right to litigate a
claim individually is “best expressed in Clint Eastwood’s ominous question ‘Do you
feel lucky?’”); see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 28, at 1171 n.44 (“Our legal system
has privileged the ‘first come, first served’ rule in many contexts:  first to the
courthouse, first to record the deed, first to file a security interest, first to convert the
property to use, etc.”); Rice & Davis, supra note 2, at 140 (asserting that individual
litigation of a claim should be the prevalent method through which to resolve mass
tort claims, and arguing that “[t]he only party that suffers . . . is the individual
claimant who is out of work on disability, without adequate insurance, and facing
rising medical costs, and who happens to be behind 5,000 previously filed cases”).
286. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 28, at 1161 (recognizing that “[i]f living in a
mass society means we produce mass harms and the need for ‘mass compensation’”
then the need for “mass justice” exists as well).
287. See David Hricik, The 1998 Mass Tort Symposium:  Legal Ethical Issues at the
Cutting Edge of Substantive and Procedural Law, 17 REV. LITIG. 419, 419 (1998)
(summarizing the academic view that current legal ethics rules are not applicable to
“the mass action paradigm”); cf. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 28, at 1161 (positing
that the current rules regulating ethics may need to be re-crafted).
288. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981).
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preceded the majority of mass tort cases present in the judicial system
today.290  No consideration was given to the “mass action paradigm”291
when these rules were drafted.292  Forced application of these ethical
and professional rules in the mass tort context consequently is
ineffective, and perhaps even detrimental.293
When evaluating counsels’ ethical and professional obligations to
the class members, the Supreme Court should focus on expediting a
victim’s claim in a just, fair and inexpensive manner.  This
perspective suggests that the Supreme Court relinquish the
“individualistic ethos”294 view,295 and instead, consider larger public
policy considerations and construct a legal response that addresses
“the social, economic, and political needs of the community at
large.”296
CONCLUSION:  IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT’S ORTIZ V. FIBREBOARD
DECISION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Supreme Court must take an active role in resolving the
                                                 
289. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
290. See Hricik, supra note 287, at 419-20 (summarizing observations that mass tort
actions were not considered when the ethical rules were drafted).
291. See id.; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 28, at 1168-69 n.35 (noting that
during drafting negotiations of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, efforts to
create ethical guidelines and disciplinary actions for lawyers involved in negotiations
or settlements were defeated).
292. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 28, at 1172 (suggesting that mass tort actions
raise unique ethical issues distinct from those arising in the individual representation
situations on which current ethical rules are based).
293. See Hricik, supra note 287, at 420 (suggesting that the efficacy of certain
ethical rules diminishes when applied in the mass tort context).
294. YEAZELL, supra note 10, at 14.
295. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 28, at 1161 n.5 (stating that the United
States’ justice system “adhere[s] to the rhetoric and beliefs of a system based on
individual justice values”).
296. See Hricik, supra note 287, at 422 n.10 (quoting Kenneth R. Feinberg,
Lawyering in Mass Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2177, 2177 (1997)).  Although no current
resolution to the ethical problems posed by settlement class actions in the mass tort
context exists, many commentators and legal scholars have proffered possible
solutions that require a flexible approach to existing ethical rules and models of
professional conduct.  See, e.g., Adrogue, supra note 256, at 451 (discussing various
commentators’ views on ethical issues arising in complex mass tort litigation);
Coffee, supra note 269, at 857 (recommending reform including reducing caseloads
of the federal courts); Green, supra note 12, at 1793-94 (discussing due process and
constitutional concerns); Hricik, supra note 287, at 419 (summarizing symposium
participants’ views and concluding that “the ethical issues arising under the unique
circumstances that accompany mass tort litigation at best results in incomplete and
unsatisfactory solutions, and at worst creates actual barriers to substantive justice”);
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 28, at 1219 (highlighting the need for “substantive,
procedural, and ethical solutions”).  See generally Charles W. Wolfram, Mass Torts—
Messy Ethics, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1228, 1234-35 (1995) (analyzing various
recommendations for reform and suggesting that more control by class action
claimants and defendants, rather than lawyers, may be an alternate solution).
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current crisis surrounding mass tort litigation.297  Extensive debate
exists over whether the judicial system or legislation should provide
the solution to this crisis.298  Despite strong insinuations by the
Supreme Court,299 however, Congress has chosen not to act300 on what
is coined as “the godparent of mass tort litigation today,”301 namely
claims involving asbestos exposure.  Thus, the resolution of the
growing number of mass tort claims currently rests upon the
shoulders of the judicial system.  The Supreme Court should seize the
chance in Ortiz v. Fibreboard to develop the use of settlement class
actions as an alternative to individual litigation of a mass tort claim.302
Because the Supreme Court in Amchem failed to address either
notice or ethical issues involved in settlement class actions,303
subsequent settlement class actions provide limited guidance.
Moreover, the applicability of the Amchem decision concerning
adequate representation potentially is limited to those suits filed
under Rule 23(b)(3).304  Thus, the Ortiz decision also presents an
opportunity for the Court to clarify the guidelines and procedures for
using settlement class actions in the context of mass torts.
The Supreme Court should affirm the Fifth Circuit’s holding in
Flanagan that approved the settlement class action.  First, the
                                                 
297. See Access, Equity and Finality of Adjudication—The Role of Class Actions in our
Civil Justice System:  Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (Mar. 5, 1998), available in
1998 WL 278332 (testimony of Elizabeth J. Cabraser) (advocating that federal courts
should have a central and active role in the use and application of class actions in
mass tort litigation).
298. The issues concerning legislative versus judicial response are too great to
address adequately within the scope of this Comment.  Nevertheless, this issue is
mentioned in recognition that to preserve the settlement class action, the Supreme
Court must view itself as an activist in social and political change, much as it did
throughout the civil rights era.  See supra note 189 and accompanying text (discussing
various arguments against using settlement class actions in the mass tort context).
299. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 629 (1997) (noting the
sensibility of providing an administrative compensation procedure to handle mass
tort claims, but stating that “Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution”).
300. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 28, at 1184-85 (arguing that Congress has
forced the judicial system to use settlement class actions to address the mass tort
litigation crisis by virtue of their inaction).
301. Cohen, supra note 2, at 277; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 28, at 1172
n.48 (noting the irony that persons criticize judicial activism in the mass tort
context—an area where no legislative action has been taken).
302. See Cohen, supra note 2, at 274-75 (describing several critical points in the
battle with mass tort litigation, such as:  the Amchem decision, the “tobacco
settlement” and related legislation, and the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission’s recommendation to Congress to amend the Bankruptcy Code to
provide mechanisms to explicitly handle mass tort liability).
303. See supra Part IV.B-C (discussing the notice aspect of the due process analysis,
as well as ethical issues and responsibilities).
304. See supra Part II.C (analyzing Amchem and its significance in the settlement
class action context).
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Flanagan settlement provides for adequate representation of the
plaintiff class.305  Second, the settlement class action is filed as a
“limited fund,” an equitable classification,306 and therefore, no notice
is required.307  Third, the possibility of collusion between defendants’
and plaintiffs’ counsel is minimal in Flanagan because of certain
precautions taken by the Fifth Circuit.308  Finally, the Supreme Court
should remain cognizant of the judicial need for an effective solution
to the problems raised by mass tort litigation.309  This requires the
Supreme Court to establish clear procedural guidelines that ensure
injured victims of mass torts receive compensation for their claims in
a fair and efficient manner.  The Court’s proposal must preserve the
settlement class action as a viable, realistic, and affordable alternative
to costly and inefficient litigation, especially in the face of legislative
inaction.  In short, the Supreme Court should remain loyal to the
equitable principles that gave rise to the settlement class action310 and
realize that “[e]quity, the foundation of the American class action,
does not permit any litigant to be priced out of access to civil
justice.”311
                                                 
305. See supra Part IV.A (addressing the adequate representation aspect of the due
process analysis).
306. See Bass & Robinson, supra note 257, at 221 (describing that class actions filed
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) are grounded in equity and commonly involve future
claimants who do not yet know of their injuries).
307. See YEAZELL, supra note 10, at 13-14 (noting that “courts have declined to hold
that the individual citizen has the right of notice and hearing in regard to legislative
or executive action that affects large numbers of people”); see also supra Part IV.B
(discussing the notice prong of the due process analysis).
308. See supra Part IV.C (analyzing the appearance of collusion in settlement
proposals and various ethical issues).
309. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (addressing arguments against
using settlement class actions in the mass tort context).
310. See supra Part I.A-C (tracing the historical development of the class action).
311. Cabraser, supra note 48, at 378.
